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Abstract
Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems.
We study the complexity of manipulation, constructive control by deleting
voters (CCDV), and bribery for scoring systems. For manipulation, we
show that for all scoring rules with a constant number of different coeffi-
cients, manipulation is in P. And we conjecture that there is no dichotomy
theorem.
On the other hand, we obtain dichotomy theorems for CCDV and
bribery problem. More precisely, we show that both of these problems
are easy for 1-approval, 2-approval, 1-veto, 2-veto, 3-veto, generalized 2-
veto, and (2, 1, ..., 1, 0), and hard in all other cases. These results are the
“dual” of the dichotomy theorem for the constructive control by adding
voters (CCAV) problem from Hemaspaandra et al. (2014), but do not at
all follow from that result. In particular, proving hardness for CCDV is
harder than for CCAV since we do not have control over what the con-
troller can delete, and proving easiness for bribery tends to be harder than
for control, since bribery can be viewed as control followed by manipula-
tion.
∗Supported in part by NSF grant CCF-1101452 and by COST Action IC1205. Work done
in part while H. Schnoor visited the University of Rochester supported by an STSM grant of
Cost Action IC1205.
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Introduction
Elections are an important way to make decisions, both in human and electronic
settings. Arguably the most important class of election systems are the scoring
rules. A scoring rule is defined by, for each number m of candidates, a scoring
vector α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. In addition, we typically want these vectors
to be somehow similar. This is captured nicely by the notion of pure scoring
rules from Betzler and Dorn (2010) where the length-(m+1) vector is obtained
by adding a coefficient in the length-m vector. Voters have complete tie-free
preferences over the candidates, and a candidate ranked ith by a voter receives
a score of αi from that voter. The winners are the candidates with the highest
score.
We are interested in determining, for all scoring rules at once, which of them
give rise to easy computational problems and which of them lead to hard prob-
lems. Theorems of that form are known as dichotomy theorems. For weighted
scoring rules, in which each voter has a weight w and counts as w regular vot-
ers, there are dichotomy theorems for all standard manipulative actions: ma-
nipulation Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra (2007), bribery Faliszewski et al.
(2009), and control Faliszewski et al. (2015). The arguably more natural un-
weighted case is much harder to analyze (since in the unweighted case we can
only get hardness when the number of candidates is unbounded, whereas in the
weighted case hardness already occurs with a fixed number of candidates; since
weighted dichotomy theorems typically look at a fixed number of candidates,
the results for the unweighted cases do not at all follow from the results for
the weighted cases). Despite the prevalence of scoring rules, there are only two
dichotomy theorems for the unweighted case, namely for the possible winner
problem Betzler and Dorn (2010); Baumeister and Rothe (2012) and for the
constructive control by adding voters (CCAV) problem Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014).
In this paper, we look at bribery and manipulation for unweighted scoring
rules, and, since bribery can be viewed as deleting voters followed by a ma-
nipulation, we also look at the constructive control by deleting voters (CCDV)
problem.
For manipulation, we show that for all scoring rules with a constant num-
ber of different coefficients, manipulation is in P. This subsumes all known
polynomial-time results for unweighted manipulation for scoring rules. We con-
jecture that there is no dichotomy theorem for manipulation.
For bribery and CCDV, we obtain a dichotomy theorem for pure scoring
rules. In particular, we show exactly when these problems are easy (in P)
and that they are hard (NP-complete) in all other cases. Interestingly, our
characterization is the “dual” of the CCAV characterization in the following
sense: For every scoring rule f , the complexity of f -CCDV (and of f -bribery) is
the same as for dual (f)-CCAV, where dual (f) is obtained from f by multiplying
each entry in a scoring vector by −1, and reversing the order of the vector.
These results are quite surprising: CCDV has less structure to encode hard
problems into it than CCAV, but we still obtain the same complexity charac-
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terization (modulo duality). On the other hand, bribery can be seen as the
combination of CCDV and manipulation, but the complexity is the same as
for CCDV. However, in another sense bribery behaves very differently from
CCDV: The complexity of bribery changes from polynomial-time solvable to
NP-complete by small changes in the definition of the problem, while the com-
plexity of the former is much more robust.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 1, we introduce relevant
definitions, including the specific problems we study in this paper. In Section 2,
we state our results on manipulation. Section 3 contains our dichotomy result
for CCDV and bribery. Our individual complexity results for CDDV and bribery
can be found in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We conclude with open questions
in Section 6. All proofs not contained in the main paper can be found in the
appendix.
1 Preliminaries
An election consists of a non-empty, finite set of candidates and a finite set of
voters. Each voter is identified with her vote, which is simply a linear order on
the set of candidates. An election system or voting rule is a rule that, given
an election, determines the set of candidates who are winners of the election
according to this rule. A scoring vector for m candidates is simply a vector
(α1, . . . , αm) of integer coefficients, where αi ≥ αi+1 for all 1 ≤ i < m. Such a
vector defines a voting rule for elections with m candidates by simply awarding,
for each vote in the election, αi points to the candidate ranked in the i-th po-
sition of this vote, and defining the candidates with the most points to be the
winners of the election. A scoring rule is an election system that for each num-
ber of candidates applies an appropriate scoring vector. Such a system can be
described by a generator, which is a function f such that for each m ∈ N, f(m)
is a scoring vector for m candidates. Well-known scoring rules are Borda (using
f(m) = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0)), k-approval (using f(m) = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k many
, 0, . . . , 0))
and k-veto (using f(m) = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k many
)) for natural numbers k. For read-
ability, we usually identify a generator with the election system it defines.
To capture that the elections for different numbers of candidates should
use “similar” generators, we use the following notion Betzler and Dorn (2010):
A generator f as above is pure, if for all m ≥ 1, the vector f(m) can be
obtained from the vector f(m+1) by removing one coefficient from the sequence.
In Hemaspaandra et al. (2014), it is shown that the restriction to the set of pure
generators with rational numbers covers all generators in a large and reasonable
class.
We define standard manipulative actions: Manipulation Bartholdi et al. (1989);
Conitzer et al. (2007), bribery Faliszewski et al. (2009), and control Bartholdi et al.
(1992), for generators.
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Definition 1.1. For a generator f , the constructive control problem for f by
deleting voters, f -CCDV, is the following problem: Given a set of voters V
over a set of candidates C, a candidate p ∈ C and a number k, is there a subset
V ′ ⊆ V with ‖V ′‖ ≤ k such that p is a winner of the election if the votes in
V − V ′ are evaluated using f?
A similar problem, the constructive control problem for f by adding voters,
called f -CCAV, asks whether p can be made a winner by adding to V at most
k voters from a given set of so-called unregistered voters. In the manipulation
problem for f , we are given a set V of nonmanipulative voters and a set of
manipulators, and we ask whether p can be made a winner by setting the votes of
the manipulators, with no restriction on how these votes can be chosen. Finally,
the bribery problem for f asks whether p can be made a winner by replacing
up to k votes in V with the same number of arbitrary votes. Clearly, for every
polynomial-time uniform generator f , the problems f -CCDV, f -bribery, and
f -manipulation are in NP.
Two scoring vectors (α1, . . . , αm) and (β1, . . . , βm) are equivalent if they
describe the same election system, i.e., if for any election, they lead to the same
winner set. It is easy to see Hemaspaandra et al. (2014) that this is the case if
and only if there are numbers γ > 0 and δ such that for each i, βi = γαi+δ. We
say that f1 and f2 are ultimately equivalent if f1(m) and f2(m) are equivalent
for all but finitely many m. It is easy to see that in this case, CCDV, bribery,
and manipulation have the same complexity for f1 and f2.
For algorithms, we need the function f is efficiently computable. A generator
f is polynomial-time uniform if f(m) can be computed in polynomial time, given
m in unary. (Given m in binary, polynomial time would not suffice to even write
down a sequence of m numbers.) For the remainder of this paper, a generator
is always a polynomial-time uniform pure generator with rational coefficients.
2 Manipulation
Our main result on manipulation is the following: Every generator f for which
there is a fixed, finite upper bound on the number of coefficients that are used for
any number of candidates has a polynomial-time solvable manipulation problem.
We mention that this result also holds for generators that are not pure (but still
are polynomial-time uniform). We note that the special cases where f generates
k-approval or k-veto were shown in Zuckerman et al. (2009).
Theorem 2.1. Let f be a generator such that there is a constant c such that
for each number m of candidates, at most c different coefficients appear in the
vector f(m). Then f -manipulation can be solved in polynomial time.
We give a proof sketch for a simple special case of the theorem, namely
generators f of the form f = (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α). With great care, this proof
sketch generalizes to the general case.
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Proof. (Sketch) Consider a preferred candidate p, a set of candidates C =
{c1, . . . , cm, p}, a surplus surplus(c) for each c ∈ C (i.e., the value score(c) −
score(p), which can easily be computed from the election instance, as f is
polynomial-time uniform), and a set of k manipulators. Clearly, we can as-
sume that all manipulators will vote p first.
The obvious greedy approach of having a manipulator rank a candidate with
the largest surplus last won’t always work: If β = 2, α = 3, the surplus of c1 is 4,
the surplus of c2 and c3 is 3, and we have two manipulators, the only successful
manipulation is to have the manipulators vote · · · > c1 > c2 and · · · > c1 > c3
and so we cannot put c1 last.
If there is a successful manipulation, then for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there are
numbers xi and yi (the number of times ci is ranked next to last / last by a
manipulator) such that:
1. xi + yi ≤ k,
2.
∑
1≤i≤m xi = k,
3.
∑
1≤i≤m yi = k, and
4. surplus(ci)− βxi − αyi ≤ 0.
We derive an algorithm deciding the condition by dynamic programming.
For this, we define the Boolean predicate M such that M(k, kβ , kα, s1, . . . , sℓ)
is true if and only if for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there exist natural numbers xi and yi
such that
1. xi + yi ≤ k,
2.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ xi = kβ ,
3.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ yi = kα, and
4. si − βxi − αyi ≤ 0.
It is immediate that if there is a successful manipulation, thenM(k, k, k, surplus(c1), . . . , surplus(cm))
is true. It is not so easy to see that the converse holds. This is shown by induc-
tion on k. It is easy to come up with a simple ad-hoc proof for the simple case
we are looking at here, but we will instead describe an approach that generalizes
to the general case.
The inductive step uses the following argument. IfM(k+1, kβ, kα, s1, . . . , sℓ)
is true, let X = {ci | xi > 0} and let Y = {ci | yi > 0}. Then the sequence
(X,Y ) can be shown to fulfill the “marriage condition,” which then, by Hall’s
Theorem Hall (1935), implies that there is a “traversal,” i.e., a sequence of
distinct representatives of this sequence of sets which then gives us a vote for
one of the manipulators. In this particular case, the traversal consists of two
distinct candidates (ci, cj) such that xi > 0 and yj > 0. Let one manipulator
vote · · · > ci > cj , subtract 1 from xi and yj, subtract β from surplus(ci), and
subtract α from from surplus(cj). It follows from the induction hypothesis that
the remaining k manipulators can vote to make p a winner.
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To conclude the proof sketch, we can show by dynamic programming that
M is computable in polynomial for unary k, kα, kβ (which is sufficient to solve
the manipulation problem). This holds since:
1. M(k, kβ , kα) is true if and only if kβ = kα = 0.
2. For ℓ ≥ 1,M(k, kβ , kα, s1, . . . , sℓ) if and only if there exist natural numbers
xℓ and yℓ such that:
(a) xℓ + yℓ ≤ k,
(b) xℓ ≤ kβ ,
(c) yℓ ≤ kα,
(d) sℓ − βxℓ − αyℓ ≤ 0, and
(e) M(k, kβ − xℓ, kα − yℓ, s1, . . . , sℓ−1).
Given Theorem 2.1 and the fact that manipulation for Borda is NP-complete Betzler et al.
(2011); Davies et al. (2011), it is natural to ask whether the manipulation prob-
lem is NP-complete for all remaining generators. But this is extremely unlikely:
Though our approach does not give polynomial-time algorithms when the num-
ber of coefficients is unbounded, it will give quasipolynomial algorithms when
the coefficients are small enough and grow slowly enough.
It is also conceivable that additional cases will be in P. Though a general
greedy approach seems unlikely (as manipulation for Borda is NP-complete), a
greedy approach for specific cases is still possible.
We conjecture that there is no dichotomy theorem for manipulation for pure
scoring rules, with different intermediate (between P and NP-complete) com-
plexities showing up.
3 CCDV and Bribery Dichotomy
We completely characterize the complexity of f -CCDV and f -bribery for every
generator f . For each generator f , these two problems are polynomial-time
equivalent, and are polynomial-time solvable or NP-complete. For the cases
where f generates k-approval or k-veto, the complexity classification is already
stated in Lin (2012). For CCDV, the special case where f generates 1-approval
was shown in Bartholdi et al. (1992). For bribery, the special cases where f
generates 1-approval or 1-veto were shown in Faliszewski et al. (2009). We also
note the existence of an unpublished manuscript that proves NP-hardness for
bribery for generators of the form (α, β, 0, . . . , 0), where α and β are coprimes
with α > β ≥ 1 Caragiannis et al. (2012).
Theorem 3.1. Let f be a pure, polynomial-time uniform generator. If f is
ultimately equivalent to one of the following generators, then f -CCDV and f -
bribery can be solved in polynomial time:
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1. f1 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, 0) (3-veto),
2. f2 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (1-approval),
3. f3 = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (2-approval),
4. for some α ≥ β ≥ 0, f4 = (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α) (this includes triviality,
1-veto, and 2-veto),
5. f5 = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
Otherwise, f -CCDV and f -bribery are NP-complete.
This dichotomy theoremmirrors the one obtained for CCAV in Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014) (modulo duality, see below). For the relationship of CCDV and CCAV,
this implies that the difficulty of implementing “setup votes” (see below) does
not have any influence on the complexity of our decision problems for the class
of generators we study. The below proof of Theorem 4.4 is an example of a
non-trivial implementation of these setup votes.
In particular, our results imply that the complexity of CCDV is “robust” in
the following sense: The complexity of CCDV does not depend on whether we
add a bit to each voter stating whether she can be deleted or not. This will be
made formal below in our discussion of CCDV∗ (defined below).
The situation is different for bribery: Generalizing the bribery problem to
allow marking some voters as “unbribable” increases the complexity to NP-
complete for some generators. As an example of this phenomenon, we state the
following result. (The version of bribery defined here may be of independent
interest, but is only used here to highlight the differences between CCDV and
bribery.)
Theorem 3.2. The variation of the bribery problem for (0, . . . , 0,−1,−2) where
each voter has a bit that states whether this voter can be bribed or not is NP-
complete.
4 Control by Deleting Voters
In this section we give an overview over our proof of CCDV-part of Theorem 3.1.
In Section 4.1, we show that our CCDV polynomial-time cases easily follow from
a relationship to CCAV, whose complexity was studied in Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014). Sections 4.2 and 4.3 then contain our hardness results for CCDV.
4.1 Relationship between CCAV and CCDV and CCDV
polynomial time cases
CCDV and CCAV are closely related as follows: For a generator f , let dual (f)
be the generator obtained from f by multiplying each coefficient with −1 and
reversing the order of the coefficients (to maintain monotonicity). Removing a
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vote in an f -election has the same effect as adding the same vote in a dual (f)-
election. Using this observation, one can show that f -CCDV reduces to dual (f)-
CCAV for all generators f . We mention that a similar relation holds for weighted
k-approval and k-veto elections Faliszewski et al. (2015).
The other direction of this relationship does not follow so easily, as there
is an important difference between CCDV and CCAV: In CCAV, the set of
voters is partitioned into a set of registered voters and a set of potential voters,
where the controller’s actions can only influence the potential voters. This
provides the problem with additional structure, as the controller cannot modify
the registered voters. We often call these registered votes, which the controller
cannot influence anymore, setup votes, as these allow us to set up the scenario
of an NP-hard problem in hardness proofs.
The CCDV problem does not have a corresponding structure; here every
vote may be (potentially) deleted by the controller. This makes it harder to
construct the above-mentioned setup votes: Since we cannot simply “forbid”
the controller to delete certain votes, hardness proofs for CCDV need to “setup”
the relevant scenario with votes that are designed to be “unattractive” to delete
for the controller.
To obtain CCDV hardness results, it is therefore natural to consider the
following analog to the CCAV problem: CCDV∗ is a version of CCDV provid-
ing the additional structure that CCAV has. In CCDV∗, the set of votes is
partitioned into a set R of voters that cannot be deleted, and voters D that
can be deleted. From the above discussion, it follows that the complexities of
CCAV and CCDV∗ are related with the following duality, which, together with
the polynomial-time results obtained for CCAV in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014)
immediately implies the polynomial-time CCDV cases of Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 4.1. For every generator f , f -CCDV∗ and dual (f)-CCAV are
polynomially equivalent.
Proposition 4.1 is not completely trivial, since the reductions must convert
election instances maintaining the relative points of the candidates. However,
this is done using standard constructions.
From Theorem 3.1 and the results in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014), it follows
that f -CCDV and f -CCDV∗ always have the same complexity. In fact, our
algorithms for CCDV and CCDV∗ do not take the structure of the “registered”
votes into account, but can work with scores for the candidates that do not
come from any set of votes. For bribery, the situation is quite different, see the
above Theorem 3.2.
All polynomial-time cases for CCDV follow from the above relationship in
a straight-forward manner. This is not surprising, since CCDV in the above-
discussed sense has less structure than CCAV, and thus easiness results for
CCAV translate to (dual) CCDV. The interesting part of our dichotomy is the
converse: If CCAV is NP-hard for some generator f , then CCDV is hard for
dual (f) as well.
A natural approach for the proof of the dichotomy theorem, suggested by
Proposition 4.1, is to show that f -CCDV∗ always reduces to f -CCDV. While
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this does in fact follow, proving a generic reduction from f -CCDV∗ to f -CCDV
for all generators f seems to be difficult, due to the additional structure provided
by CCDV∗.
Our proof of the CCDV part of Theorem 3.1 therefore uses a case distinction
to obtain f -CCDV hardness for each remaining pure, polynomial-time uniform
generator f .
We note that due to the relationship between CCDV and CCAV, all CCAV-
hardness results in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014) easily follow from the results
obtained in the current paper. However, our proofs make use of the results and
proofs from Hemaspaandra et al. (2014).
4.2 CCDV hardness: “few coefficients”
We first consider generators with “few” different coefficients, i.e., generators
of the form f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) for rationals α1, . . . , α6.
1 Using
equivalence-preserving transformations, we can assume that all αi are nonnega-
tive integers, and that their greatest common divisor is 1. Note that a generator
of this form is trivially polynomial-time uniform.
4.2.1 Reductions from CCDV∗
A general reduction from f -CCDV to f -CCDV∗ does not seem feasible, as dis-
cussed above. However, there are cases where hardness of f -CCDV∗ leads to
hardness of f -CCDVwith a direct proof. The following two results (Theorems 4.2
and 4.3) are proven in this way.
Theorem 4.2. Let f = (α, 0, . . . , 0,−β) be a generator with 1 ≤ α < β. Then
f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. (Sketch) From Hemaspaandra et al. (2014), we know that dual (f)-CCAV
is NP-complete, Proposition 4.1, then implies that f -CCDV∗ is NP-complete as
well. We show that f -CCDV∗ reduces to f -CCDV. Given an instance of f -
CCDV∗, we convert it into an equivalent instance of f -CCDV by replacing the
undeletable votes R with votes that
1. result in the same relative points as the votes in R, and
2. are not deleted in a successful CCDV action.
We denote a vote c1 > c2 > · · · > cn−1 > cn simply as c1 > cn (the rest
is irrelevant). With some light preprocessing, we can assume that no deletable
vote has p in the first or last position, this allows us to compute the number
score(p) of points that p will have after the delete action. Similarly, we can
assume that score(p) = Npα for some Np ≥ 2.
Satisfying point 1 above boils down to add, for an arbitrary candidate c 6= p,
votes that let c gain α points against p, and which will not be deleted. This
1This only uniquely defines f for elections with at least 6 candidates, however f is uniquely
defined up to ultimate equivalence, which is sufficient for the complexity analysis.
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is done as follows: We add dummy candidates d1, . . . , dℓ (for a suitably chosen
number ℓ) and a single vote c > d1, letting c gain α points relative to p. To
ensure that the vote c > d1 cannot be removed, we add votes setting up the
scores as follows:
• Each di for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1 ties with p,
• the only way to make di lose points (relative to p) is to remove votes
di > di+1, which then lets di+1 gain points (relative to p).
Hence removing the vote c > d1, which lets d1 gain β points relative to p
requires the controller to remove votes of the form d1 > d2, which each lets d2
gain β points. This process continues for di with i ≥ 2. Thus, removing c > d1
triggers a “chain” of additional removals—more than the budget allows. The
numbers of votes needed to setup grows exponentially in the number of steps.
However, since the controller can only remove a polynomial number of votes,
we only require logarithmically many steps, yielding a polynomial construction.
Constructing the actual set of votes that results in the above scores and
satisfies the two points above is nontrivial, the construction is in fact the main
technical difficulty in the proof.
The following result is shown similarly, the difference is that instead of loga-
rithmically many steps of an exponentially growing construction, here we apply
a simpler linear process.
Theorem 4.3. Let f = (α, 0, . . . , 0,−β) be a generator with α > β ≥ 1. Then
f -CCDV is NP-complete.
4.2.2 Reductions by inspection of the CCAV reduction
Similarly to the preceding Section 4.2.1, the results in this section are proved by
a reduction from f -CCDV∗ to f -CCDV. However, while the reductions above
were “generic” (reducing from an arbitrary CCDV∗-instance), we now start with
instances of f -CCDV∗ produced by the hardness proof of f -CCDV∗. Therefore,
we do not need to construct “setup votes” that implement any possible given
set of scores, but only need to achieve exactly the points used in the hardness
proof of dual (f)-CCAV in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014).
In the following theorem, this is a significant advantage, as here the “setup
votes” grant more points to the preferred candidate than to the remaining can-
didates. Therefore, it is easy to construct these votes in such a way that the
controller has no incentive to delete them.
The proof of the theorem also illustrates the relationship between hardness
results for CCAV (as obtained in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014)), and the hardness
results for CCDV and bribery we obtain in the current paper: The proof of
Theorem 4.4 below uses the reduction of the corresponding hardness result for
CCAV in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014) as a starting point, but is technically more
involved. We will later re-use parts of the following construction to obtain the
corresponding hardness result for bribery as well, in the later Theorem 5.5.
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Theorem 4.4. Let f = (α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α3 > α4 > α6. Then
f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. For the proof, we equivalently write f as f = (0, . . . , 0,−γ,−β,−α)
with 0 < γ < α. Then, dual (f) = (α, β, γ, 0, . . . , 0). From Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014), it follows that dual (f)-CCAV is NP-complete, and hence, due to Propo-
sition 4.1, it suffices to show that f -CCDV∗ reduces to f -CCDV.
Therefore, let an f -CCDV∗ instance with undeletable votes R, deletable
votes D, preferred candidate p, and budget ℓ be given. From the proof of
Proposition 4.1, we can assume that this instance is obtained from the hardness
proof of dual (f)-CCAV as follows:
• the votes in D are exactly the votes available for addition in the CCAV
instance, with the order of candidates reversed,
• the relative points gained by the candidates from the votes in R ∪D are
the same as the points of the candidates in the CCAV instance (before
the addition of votes by the controller).
The hardness proof of dual (f)-CCAV uses a reduction from 3DM. 3DM is
the following problem: Given a multiset M ⊆ X × Y × Z with X , Y and Z
pairwise disjoint sets of equal size such that each s ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in
exactly 3 tuples of M , decide whether there is a set C ⊆ M with ‖C‖ = ‖X‖
such that each s ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in some tuple of C (we also say that
C covers s). From the problem definition, it follows that ‖M‖ = 3‖X‖. The
condition that each s appears in exactly 3 tuples is not standard; we prove in
the appendix remains NP-complete.
Let M ⊆ X × Y × Z be an instance of 3DM. Following the notation used
in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014), we set n = ‖M‖ and k = ‖X‖. Since ‖M‖ =
3‖X‖ in every 3DM instance, it follows that n = 3k. The hardness proof of
dual (f)-CCAV, translated to the CCDV setting (i.e., we present the votes as in
the CCDV instance—as reversals of votes from the CCAV instance), constructs
the following situation:
• the candidate set is {p} ∪X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {Si, S′i | Si ∈M},
• for each Si = (x, y, z) ∈ M , the following votes are available for deletion
(we only list the candidates gaining non-zero points from the vote):
– · · · > Si > p > x
– · · · > Si > p > y
– · · · > S′i > p > z
– · · · > S′i > p > Si
• the relative scores resulting from the registered voters of the CCAV in-
stance (i.e., the undeletable voters of the CCDV∗ instance) are as follows:
– scorefinal(p) = α+ 2γ,
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– scorefinal(c) = (n+ 2k)β + 2γ for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
– scorefinal(Si) = (n+ 2k)β +min(α, 2γ),
– scorefinal(S
′
i) = (n+ 2k)β + α+ γ.
From the above votes introduced for the 3DM-elements, the candidates gain
the following initial points—recall that each c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z appears in exactly 3
triples from M , and, since ‖M‖ = n = 3k, and there are 4 votes introduced for
every element in M , there are exactly 12k deletable votes introduced above:
• score3DM (p) = −12kβ, since p gains −β points in each of the 12k votes,
• score3DM (Si) = −2γ − α, since Si gains 0 points in all of the votes intro-
duced for other elements Sj 6= Si ∈ M , and gains −γ points in 2 of the
votes above, and −α points in one of the vote,
• score3DM (S′i) = −2γ analogously,
• score3DM (c) = −3α for each c ∈ X∪Y ∪Z, since each c appears in exactly
3 triples Si from M .
For each candidate x, the undeletable votes from the CCDV∗ instance thus
let her gain exactly scorefinal(x)− score3DM (x) points (modulo an offset added
to the points of all candidates, since the CCAV reduction relies on an imple-
mentation lemma that only fixes the relative points of each candidate). The
scores that the undeletable votes implement are therefore as follows (recall that
n = 3k):
candidate x scorefinal(x) − score3DM (x)
p 12kβ + α+ 2γ
c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z 5kβ + 3α+ 2γ
Si 5kβ + α+ 2γ +min(α, 2γ)
S′i 5kβ + α+ 3γ
Since we only need to implement the relative scores among the candidates,
it is enough to consider the points the candidates have to gain/lose relative to
p. These are as follows (clearly, p does not gain or lose any points relative to
herself):
candidate x points x needs to lose (result)
c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z 7kβ − 2α
Si 7kβ −min(α, 2γ)
S′i 7kβ − γ
To achieve this, we first introduce three dummy candidates d1, d2, and d3 (by
placing them in the 0-point segment of all present votes), and add sufficiently
many votes voting all relevant candidates ahead of the dummy candidates. This
lets the dummies lose α, β, or γ points relatively to the other candidates; we
do this often enough to ensure that the dummy candidates cannot win the
election. Using these dummies, we can easily let a relevant candidate c 6= p lose
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δ ∈ {α, β, γ} points, by using a vote placing c in the position worth −δ points,
filling the other two positions out of the last three with dummy candidates, and
voting the remaining candidates (including p) in the positions gaining 0 points.
Such a vote will never be deleted by the controller, since it has p in the first
position.
If 1 = δ ∈ {α, β, γ}, then the required amount of points can easily be
achieved by repeatedly losing δ = 1 points as described above. Hence assume
that, in particular, β ≥ 2. For the candidate c, we proceed as follows:
• We add β − 2 many votes letting c lose α point each.
• After this, c, still needs to lose (7k − α)β points, which we can achieve
by using 7k−α many votes letting c lose β points as described above (we
can without loss of generality assume that 7k ≥ α).
For candidates Si and S
′
i, we proceed analogously.
It hence follows that p can be made a winner by removing at most ℓ votes in
the CCDV∗ instance if and only if this is possible in the constructed f -CCDV
instance.
The following result uses a similar, but technically more involved argument.
Theorem 4.5. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3) with α1 > α2 > α3. Then f -CCDV
is NP-complete.
4.2.3 Direct Proofs
The remaining cases are shown with a direct proof (reducing from a variant
of three dimensional matching, 3DM); they are in part similar to the hardness
proofs of CCAV in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014).
Theorem 4.6. f -CCDV is NP-complete in the following cases:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α5.
2. f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α6) with α1, α2 > α3 > α6.
3. f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α4.
4.3 CCDV hardness: “Many” coefficients
In Section 4.2, we have covered all generators of the form f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6).
Generators not of this form must satisfy αm3 > α
m
m−3 for some value m. We now
prove that the CCDV problem is NP-hard for all generators satisfying this con-
dition. The proof is similar to the corresponding result in Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014).
An important observation is that when αm3 > α
m
m−3 holds for some m, then
purity of our generators implies that the condition also holds for any m′ ≥ m.
Clearly, if m ≥ 6 is a multiple of 3 and αm3 > αmm−3, then one of αm3 > αm2
3
m
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and αm2
3
m
> αmm−3 must hold. In the first case, the generator—for this number
m of candidates—behaves in a similar way as 3-approval in the sense that there
are three positions in the vote that let the candidates gain more points than a
“large” number of positions later in the sequence of coefficients. In the latter
case, the generator (for this number m) behaves similarly to 4-veto, as there are
four “bad” positions in the votes.
Therefore, a generator satisfying αm3 > α
m
m−3 behaves, for every m
′ ≥ m,
similarly to 3-approval or to 4-veto. However, the behavior can be different for
different values for m. Therefore, our proof of NP-completeness for generators
satisfying this condition uses an “adaptive” reduction from the problem 3DM,
which, given a 3DM instance, constructs either a reduction exploiting the “3-
approval likeness” or the “4-veto likeness” of the generator, depending on the
size of the instance (which linearly corresponds to the number of candidates in
the constructed election instance). This gives the following result:
Theorem 4.7. Let f be a polynomial-time pure generator such that αm3 > α
m
m−3
for some m. Then f -CCAV is NP-hard.
5 Bribery
Bribery is closely related to both CCDV and manipulation: Bribing k voters
can be viewed as deleting k voters followed by adding k manipulation voters.
We thus can use our results obtained for CCDV and manipulation in Sections 2
and 4 as a starting point to obtain a complexity classification of the bribery
problem.
However, it is not necessarily the case that an optimal bribery consists of an
optimal deletion followed by an optimal manipulation (see Example 5.4), and
so it is possible for bribery to be hard while the manipulation and deletion of
voters problems are easy. However, we will show that for every pure scoring
rule f , f -Bribery is polynomial-time solvable if and only if f -CCDV is, though
the proofs for Bribery are more (and sometimes much more) involved.
We also obtain an interesting relationship between the complexities of ma-
nipulation and bribery: From Theorem 2.1, it follows that every “few coeffi-
cients” case leads to a polynomial-time solvable manipulation problem. From
Theorem 3.1, we know that, for CCDV, only such cases can be solved in poly-
nomial time (unless P = NP). Therefore, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5.1. Let f be a polynomial-time uniform pure generator. Then f -
manipulation reduces to f -CCDV and f -manipulation reduces to f -bribery.
5.1 Bribery Polynomial-Time Cases
Our first bribery algorithm (for a generator equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0)) uses a
reduction to network flow.
Theorem 5.2. (1, 0, . . . , 0,−1)-bribery is in polynomial time.
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Proof. (Sketch) There are three types of voters. Let V1 be the set of voters that
rank p last, let V2 be the set of voters that rank p neither first nor last, and let
V3 be the set of voters that rank p first. In this case, we can assume without
loss of generality that we bribe as many V1 voters as possible, followed by as
many V2 voters as possible. We never have to bribe V3 voters. All bribed voters
will put p first, so we also know p’s score after bribery.
The hardest case is the one where we bribe all V1 voters and some V2 voters.
We view bribery as deletion followed by manipulation. Delete all V1 voters.
In V2, deleting a voter a > · · · > b corresponds to transferring a point from a
to b. After deleting k voters, the deleted voters will be bribed to rank p first
and to rank some other candidate last. After deleting V1, for every candidate
c, score(c) = scoreV2∪V3(c), i.e., the score of c in V2 ∪ V3. For every V2 voter
a > · · · > b that is deleted, transfer one point from a to b. For every bribe
p > · · · > d, delete a point from d. There are exactly k bribes. After bribery,
score(p) = ‖V3‖+ k and the score of every other candidate needs to be at most
score(p) = ‖V3‖+ k.
It is not too hard to see that this problem can be translated in min-cost
network flow problem, in a similar, though somewhat more complicated, way as
in the CCAV algorithm for the same generator in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014).
We now state our second bribery result.
Theorem 5.3. Let α ≥ β ≥ 0. Then bribery for (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α) is solvable
in polynomial time.
Proof. (Sketch) As in the proof of Theorem 5.2, we partition V into V1, V2, and
V3. V1 consists of all voters in V that rank p last, V2 consists of all voters in V
that rank p second-to-last, and V3 consists of the remaining voters. In the proof
of Theorem 5.2, it was important that we never had to bribe V3 voters. This
is not always the case here, as shown in the example below. That also means
that this case is very different from CCDV, since in CCDV we never have to
delete V3 voters. It also shows that an optimal bribery is not always an optimal
deletion followed by an optimal manipulation.
Example 5.4. This example shows that we sometimes need to bribe V3 voters.
We will use the scoring rule (0, . . . , 0,−1,−3). Let C = {p, a, b, c, d, e, f} and
let V consist of the following votes:
· · · > p > a · · · > e > f · · · > f > e
· · · > p > b · · · > e > f · · · > f > e
· · · > p > c
Then score(p) = score(a) = score(b) = score(c) = −3, score(d) = 0, and
score(e) = score(f) = −8.
We can make p a winner by bribing one of the V3 voters to vote p > · · · > d.
But it is easy to see that we can not make d a winner by bribing a V2 voter,
wlog, the voter voting · · · > p > a, since in the bribed election, the score of p
will be at most −2, and so both a and d must be in the last position of the bribed
voter.
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Though we may need to bribe V3 voters, we can show that we never need to
bribe more than a constant number of V3 voters. This is crucial in obtaining a
a polynomial-time bound on a dynamic programming approach similar to, but
more complicated than, the one in the proof for Theorem 2.1.
Together with Lin’s results on the complexity of bribery for k-veto and k-
approval election systems in Lin (2012), the above results prove all polynomial-
time bribery cases of our main result, Theorem 3.1. In the remainder of Sec-
tion 5, we therefore discuss our NP-hardness results for bribery.
5.2 Bribery Hardness Approach
Our dichotomy results imply that each generator f for which CCDV is NP-hard
also has an NP-hard bribery problem. Proving this via a generic reduction from
CCDV to bribery does not seem to be easy: Even though bribery can be seen
as CCDV followed by manipulation, solving a bribery instance is not the same
as first finding an optimal deletion of votes and then performing an optimal
manipulation. Therefore, hardness of f -bribery does not easily follow from
hardness of f -CCDV. We briefly discuss a proof strategy to obtain a hardness
proof for f -bribery from a hardness proof of f -CCDV.
A key difficulty in the construction of a bribery hardness proof is that the
manipulation action of the controller allows her more freedom than her delete
action: For the latter, the reduction controls the available votes, whereas the
manipulation action can use arbitrary permutations of the candidates. However,
we can always assume that the bribed voters will vote p in the first position, and
will place any “dummy” candidates in the positions following p in their votes.
This often allows us to compute the score of p after the bribery action.
To limit the controller’s freedom in the manipulation votes, we proceed as
follows: We identify a sufficiently long subsequence of the coefficients that differ
by only a “small” amount. (Such a sequence exists by definition for the gen-
erators treated in Section 4.2, and can be found using a pigeon-hole argument
for other generators.) We then set up the points such that the “relevant” can-
didates must be placed into this “low-variation” sequence of the vote. This is
done using “blocking” candidates that must be placed in low-score positions,
and dummy candidates occupying the high-score positions (except for the first
position, in which the bribed voters always vote p). This ensures that moving
a candidate inside the “low-variation” does not make a large difference, and
allows the reduction to control the possible manipulation actions very tightly.
A second difficulty is that the controller is more powerful in bribery than
in CCDV: In bribery, she can perform a manipulation action in addition to her
delete action. Therefore, to make it “hard” for the controller to find an optimal
bribery action, the scores in the election instance must be “worse” for p than
in the CCDV setting. This leads to setup votes that are more attractive to
delete than in the CCDV case. Similarly as in CCDV, the main technical issue
is to define setup votes that both obtain the required scores and still will not be
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deleted by the controller, however due to the reasons above this is even more
difficult for bribery as for CCDV.
The ideas outlined above allow us to prove the bribery hardness results of
Theorem 3.1.
As an example for our approach to bribery hardness, we prove the following
theorem, which is the “bribery version” of Theorem 4.4. We therefore apply
our recipe to the proof of Theorem 4.4, which is the CCDV hardness result for
the same generator.
Theorem 5.5. Let f = (α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α3 > α4 > α6. Then
f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. We follow the above recipe to obtain a hardness proof for f -bribery.
Applying the recipe requires to make some changes to the construction of the
CCDV hardness proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4.4, we write f as f =
(0, . . . , 0,−γ,−β,−α). In particular, since we can assume that all bribed voters
will vote p first, the score of p will not change from manipulation votes (but
may, of course, change from the deleted votes).
The budget for the controller is, as in the CCAV proof from Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014), n+2k, where n = 3k, i.e., the budget is 5k (here, k is again the number
‖X‖ from the given 3DM instance). We make the following changes to the setup
in the proof of Theorem 4.4:
• We introduce three new distinct candidates bα, bβ , and bγ (i.e., even if
β = γ, then bβ is still a different candidate from bγ). These candidates
will be placed in the three “relevant” positions of each manipulation vote
in every successful bribery action.
• Recall that in the proof of the CCDV hardness result, i.e., Theorem 4.4,
each element (x, y, z) leads to four 3DM votes. We make the following
addition: For each 3DM vote introduced in this way, we introduce G ad-
ditional votes obtained from the 3DM votes by swapping the candidates in
the −γ and −β-positions (for an appropriate value of G). More precisely:
For each (x, y, z) ∈M , we add the following votes:
– a single vote · · · > Si > p > x
– G many votes · · · > p > Si > x
– a single vote · · · > Si > p > y
– G many votes · · · > p > Si > y
– a single vote · · · > S′i > p > z
– G many votes · · · > p > S′i > z
– a single vote · · · > S′i > p > Si
– G many votes · · · > p > S′i > Si
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The purpose of these added votes (we will call them G-votes in the sequel)
is to ensure that the candidates bα, bβ , and bγ gain points relatively to p,
using votes that are less attractive than the actual 3DM votes from the
construction of Theorem 4.4, such that the controller will delete the latter
votes instead of the G-votes.
Note that the controller will clearly vote p in the first position of all manip-
ulation votes. Therefore, the score of p will not change from the manipulation
votes, but only from the CCDV-aspect of the bribery action. Hence, the score
of p behaves in exactly the same way as in the CCDV proof. In the bribery
instance we construct, the final scores (i.e., from the 3DM votes including the
G-votes plus the setup votes that we will introduce below) will be as follows
(recall that n = 3k as above):
• scorefinal(p) = α+ 2γ,
• scorefinal(c) = 5kβ + 2γ for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
• scorefinal(Si) = 5kβ +min(α, 2γ),
• scorefinal(S′i) = 5kβ + α+ γ.
• scorefinal(b♥) = α+ 2γ + 5k(β +♥) for ♥ ∈ {α, β, γ}.
The score of b♥ is such that b♥ ties with p if 5k 3DM votes are removed
(letting p gain 5kβ points), and b♥ is placed in the −♥-position of each of the
5k manipulation votes. Since the score of b♥ cannot be decreased by deleting
3DM votes, this ensures that the b♥ candidates must in fact be placed in the
relevant positions of each manipulation vote, and therefore, with regard to the
remainder of the candidates, the construction works as in the CCDV case.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.4, we first compute the scores the candi-
dates receive from the 3DM- and G-votes, for a candidate x, we call this value
score3DM (x).
• score3DM (p) = −12k(β +Gγ), since, for each tuple in M , p gains −4β −
4Gγ points, and ‖M‖ = 3k.
• score3DM (Si) = −2γ − (G+ 1)α− 2Gβ,
• score3DM (S′i) = −2γ − 2Gβ,
• score3DM (c) = −3α(G+ 1) for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, since each c appears
in exactly 3 tuples from M ,
• score3DM (b♥) = 0 for each ♥ ∈ {α, β, γ}.
For each candidate x, with scoresetup(x) we denote the points that x needs to
receive from the setup votes in order to ensure that scorefinal(x) = score3DM (x)+
scoresetup(x), i.e., scoresetup(x) = scorefinal(x) − score3DM (x). We get the fol-
lowing:
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• scoresetup(p) = α+ 2γ + 12k(β +Gγ) = (12kG+ 2)γ + 12kβ + α,
• scoresetup(Si) = 5kβ +min(α, 2γ) + 2γ + (G+ 1)α+ 2Gβ = min(α, 2γ) +
2γ + (5k + 2G)β + (G+ 1)α,
• scoresetup(S′i) = 5kβ + α+ γ + 2γ + 2Gβ = 3γ + β(5k + 2G) + α,
• scoresetup(c) = 2γ + 5kβ + 3α(G+ 1) for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
• scoresetup(b♥) = 2γ + α+ 5k(β +♥).
Clearly, it again suffices to realize the relative scores among the candidates
(and clearly, the absolute points of all candidates will be at most 0, since we
wrote f as having no strictly positive coefficient). Hence, it suffices to construct
setup votes that for each candidate x, let x gain scoresetup(p) − scoresetup(x)
points less than the preferred candidate p; this is the number of points that the
x must lose against p from the setup votes. For each x, we get the following
value (clearly for p itself, the value is 0):
• scorelose(Si) = (12kG+2)γ+12kβ+α− (min(α, 2γ)+ 2γ+(5k+2G)β+
(G+1)α) = −min(α, 2γ)+12kGγ+β(7k−2G)−Gα, note that this value
can be made arbitrarily large if k is chosen sufficiently large, since G is
a constant chosen depending on α, β, γ, but independent of the instance
and therefore of k.
• scorelose(S′i) = (12kG+2)γ+12kβ+α− (3γ+β(5k+2G)+α) = (12kG+
2)γ+12kβ+α− 3γ− β(5k+2G)−α = γ(12kG− 1)+ β(7k− 2G), again
this value grows arbitrarily large in k.
• scorelose(c) = (12kG+2)γ+12kβ+α− (2γ+5kβ+3α(G+1)) = (12kG+
2)γ+12kβ+α− 2γ− 5kβ− 3α(G+1) = 12kGγ+7β+α(−3G− 2), again
the value grows arbitrarily large in k.
• scorelose(b♥) = (12kG+2)γ+12kβ+α− (2γ+α+5k(β+♥)) = (12kG+
2)γ+12kβ+α− 2γ−α− 5k(β+♥) = 12kGγ+(7k)β− 5k♥ = k(12Gγ+
7β − 5♥).
Note that, for a suitable choice of G, this value also grows arbitrarily for
increasing k.
Hence, all candidates must lose points against p, and the number of points
they must lose grows arbitrarily in k. Therefore, the points can be implemented
using setup votes letting a candidate x lose α, β, or γ points against all other
relevant candidates. The controller will not delete these votes, since they have
p in one of the top positions.
Note that, since bα, bβ and bγ must lose 5k(α+ β+ γ) points against p even
if p gains 5kβ points, it follows that these candidates must take all relevant
positions in the manipulation votes, and, if β > γ, then p can only win if p
indeed gains 5kβ points from the deletions, i.e., only if only non-G 3DM votes
are deleted. Therefore, for the remainder of the proof, assume that γ = β.
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It remains to show that the controller will in fact delete only the non-G-3DM
votes. Therefore, assume that there is a successful bribery action in which at
least one of the G-votes is also deleted. If for every G-vote vG that is removed
in the bribery action, the corresponding non-G vote v3DM (obtained from the
G-vote by swapping the −γ and −β positions) is not removed, then a bribery
action deleting only non-G-3DM votes can be obtained by deleting v3DM instead
of vG for every relevant vote (the effect for p is at least as good when deleting
v3DM ). Therefore, we can without loss of generality assume that there is a
successful bribery action in which there is a non-G 3DM vote v3DM such that
both v3DM and the corresponding G-vote vG are deleted. We show that in this
case, p cannot win the election. To see this, first note that p gains at most 5kβ
points from the delete actions. Therefore, after the bribery action, p’s points
are at most (recall that we can assume β = γ)
scoremax(p) ≤ α+ 2γ + (5k − 1)β + γ = α+ (5k + 2)β.
We nowmake a case distinction depending on which type ofG-vote is deleted.
• First assume that vG has a candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z in the last position.
Then the same is true for v3DM . Since both votes are deleted, c gains at
least 2α points (and note that c cannot lose points from deleting other
votes). Therefore, c has at least 5kβ + 2γ + 2α = (5k + 2)β + 2α points,
which is strictly more than scoremax(p).
• Now assume that vG has a candidate Si in the last position. Analogously
to the above, Si then gains at least 2α points, and hence ends up with
at least (recall that β = γ) 5kβ + min(α, 2γ) + 2α ≥ 5kβ + 2γ + 2α =
(5k + 2)β + 2α points, which again is strictly more than scoremax(p).
Therefore, in both cases p does not win the election and we have a contradic-
tion. Therefore, if the bribery instance is positive, then there exists a successful
bribe in which only non-G 3DM votes are deleted, as required.
6 Open Questions
The main open question is to completely characterize the complexity of f -
manipulation, for all generators f . As discussed at the end of Section 2, we
conjecture that this will not be a dichotomy theorem. As a first step, we would
like to prove that the cases listed in Theorem 2.1 are exactly the polynomial-time
cases (under some reasonable complexity-theoretic assumptions) or to construct
an explicit counterexample to this statement.
Other interesting avenues to pursue are going beyond NP-completeness, by
looking at such issues as fixed-parameter tractability (see, e.g., Faliszewski and Niedermeier
(2015)), approximability (see e.g., Faliszewski et al. (2015)), and experimental
results (see, e.g., Walsh (2011) and Rothe and Schend (2012)).
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Appendix
In this appendix, we present complete proofs for all of our results, as well
as some auxiliary results required for the proofs. The appendix is structured as
follows:
• In Section A, we prove our polynomial-time results for the manipulation
problem. The remainder of the Appendix is then decidated to proving our
dichotomy theorem.
• In Section B, we state our individual bribery hardness results results.
• Section C contains the proof of our dichotomy result for CCDV and
bribery, based on the results stated in the main paper and in Section B.
• Section D contains auxiliary results required for the invividual hardness
proofs for CCDV bribery. These results follow in Sections E and F, re-
spectively.
A Proofs for Manipulation in Polynomial Time
In this section, we state and prove correctness of our polynomial-time algo-
rithms for manipulation. We note that Theorem A.1 is a direct consequence of
Theorem 2.1. However, the proof of the special case treated in Theorem A.1 is
simpler and still contains the main ideas required to the proof of the more gen-
eral Theorem 2.1. We therefore also present the proof of the simpler result. In
addition, our proof of Theorem 5.3 below uses the algorithm from Theorem A.1.
A.1 Proof of Theorem A.1
Theorem A.1. Let α ≥ β ≥ 0. Then manipulation for (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α) is
solvable in polynomial time.
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Proof. Consider an instance of the manipulation problem, consisting of a set
of candidates C, a preferred candidate p, the surplus surplus(c) for each c ∈ C
(i.e., the value score(c)− score(p)), and a number k of available manipulators.2
Let C − {p} = {c1, . . . , cm}.
It is obvious that all manipulators can without loss of generality be assumed
to vote p in the first place. The goal of the manipulators is to ensure that after
manipulating, no candidate has a positive surplus.
Note that the obvious greedy approach of having a manipulator rank a can-
didate with the largest surplus last won’t work in all cases. For example, if
β = 2, α = 3, the surplus of c1 is 4, the surplus of c2 and c3 is 3, and we have
two manipulators, the only successful manipulation is to have the manipulators
vote · · · > c1 > c2 and · · · > c1 > c3 and so we should not put c1 last.3
Note that if there exists a successful manipulation, then for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
there exist nonnegative integers xi (the number of times ci is ranked next to
last by a manipulator) and yi (the number of times that ci is ranked last by a
manipulator) such that:
1. xi + yi ≤ k,
2.
∑
1≤i≤m xi = k,
3.
∑
1≤i≤m yi = k, and
4. surplus(ci)− βxi − αyi ≤ 0.
We define the following Boolean predicateM . M(k, kβ , kα, s1, . . . , sℓ) is true
if and only if for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there exist natural numbers xi and yi such
that
1. xi + yi ≤ k,
2.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ xi = kβ ,
3.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ yi = kα, and
4. si − βxi − αyi ≤ 0.
Note that if there is a successful manipulation, thenM(k, k, k, surplus(c1), . . . , surplus(cm))
is true. We will now show that the converse is true as well: IfM(k, k, k, surplus(c1), . . . , surplus(cm))
is true then there exists a successful manipulation.
We will prove this by induction on k. If k = 0, then for all i, surplus(ci) ≤ 0,
so p is a winner.
Now suppose that the claim holds for k ≥ 0. We will show that it also holds
for k + 1. So, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let xi, yi be natural numbers such that:
2Usually, the input to the manipulation problem does not contain the scores for each
candidate but a set of voters already having voted, but it’s clear how to get the scores from
the voters in polynomial time. Note that this means we actually prove a stronger result, where
the current scores of the candidates don’t have to be realizable and may be given in binary.
3This example is realizable with a couple of dummy candidates. Simply put (in the non-
manipulators) p last once and next-to-last twice, put c1 next-to-last twice, put c2 and c3 last
once, and fill all other last two positions with dummies, in such a way that the dummies do
not have positive surplus.
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1. for all i, xi + yi ≤ k + 1,
2.
∑
1≤i≤m xi = k + 1,
3.
∑
1≤i≤m yi = k + 1, and
4. surplus(ci)− βxi − αyi ≤ 0.
Let X = {i | xi + yi = k + 1}. Note that ‖X‖ ≤ 2. Let i, j be such that
i 6= j, xi > 0, yj > 0, and X ⊆ {i, j}. Let one manipulator vote · · · > ci > cj .
Subtract 1 from xi and yj , subtract β from surplus(ci), and subtract α from
from surplus(cj). It follows from the induction hypothesis that the remaining k
manipulators can vote to make p a winner.
To conclude the proof of Theorem A.1, we will now show, by dynamic pro-
gramming, that M is computable in polynomial time for unary k, kβ , kα ≥ 0.
This is easy:
1. M(k, kβ , kα) is true if and only if kβ = kα = 0.
2. For ℓ ≥ 1,M(k, kβ , kα, s1, . . . , sℓ) if and only if there exist natural numbers
xℓ and yℓ such that:
(a) xℓ + yℓ ≤ k,
(b) xℓ ≤ kβ ,
(c) yℓ ≤ kα,
(d) sℓ − βxℓ − αyℓ ≤ 0, and
(e) M(k, kβ − xℓ, kα − yℓ, s1, . . . , sℓ−1).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Theorem 2.1. Let f be a generator such that there is a constant c such that
for each number m of candidates, at most c different coefficients appear in the
vector f(m). Then f -manipulation can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider an instance of the manipulation problem withm+1 candidates.
Let r,m1, . . . ,mr, α2, . . . , αr be positive integers such that m1 + · · ·+mr = m,
0 > −α2 > · · · > −αr, and f(0m+1) is equivalent to (0m1 ,−αm22 , . . . ,−αmrr ).
Let the instance of the manipulation problem consist of a set of candidates
C, a preferred candidate p, the surplus surplus(c) for each c ∈ C (i.e., the
value score(c) − score(p)), and a number k of available manipulators.4 Let
C − {p} = {c1, . . . , cm}.
4Usually, the input to the manipulation problem does not contain the scores for each
candidate but a set of voters already having voted, but it’s clear how to get the scores from
the voters in polynomial time. Note that this means we actually prove a stronger result, where
both the current scores don’t have to be realizable and may be given in binary.
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It is obvious that all manipulators can without loss of generality be assumed
to vote p in the first place. The goal of the manipulators is to ensure that after
manipulating, no candidate has a positive surplus.
Note that if there exists a successful manipulation, then for all i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤
m, 2 ≤ j ≤ r, there exist nonnegative integers xi,j (the number of times ci gets
−αj points from a manipulator) such that
1.
∑
2≤j≤r xi,j ≤ k,
2.
∑
1≤i≤m xi,j = mjk, and
3. surplus(ci)−
∑r
j=2 αjxi,j ≤ 0.
We define the following Boolean predicate M . M(k, ℓ2, . . . , ℓr, s1, . . . , sℓ) is
true if and only if for all i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, 2 ≤ j ≤ r, there exist nonnegative
integers xi,j such that
1.
∑
2≤j≤r xi,j ≤ k,
2.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ xi,j = ℓj , and
3. si −
∑r
j=2 αjxi,j ≤ 0.
Note that if there is a successful manipulation, thenM(k,m2k, . . . ,mrk, surplus(c1), . . . , surplus(cm))
is true. We will now show that the converse is true as well: IfM(k,m2k, . . . ,mrk, surplus(c1), . . . , surplus(cm))
is true then there exists a successful manipulation.
We will prove this by induction on k. If k = 0, then for all i, surplus(ci) ≤ 0,
so p is a winner.
Now suppose that the claim holds for k ≥ 0. We will show that it also holds
for k+1. So, for all i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 2 ≤ j ≤ r, let xi,j be natural numbers such
that
1.
∑
2≤j≤r xi,j ≤ k + 1,
2.
∑
1≤i≤m xi,j = mj(k + 1), and
3. surplus(ci)−
∑r
j=2 αjxi,j ≤ 0.
For 2 ≤ j ≤ r, let Xj = {ci | xi,j > 0}. Consider the following sequence of
sets: m2 copies of X2 followed by m3 copies of X3 followed by . . . followed
by mr copies of Xr. We will show that this sequence fulfills the “marriage
condition,” which then, by Hall’s Theorem, implies that there is a “traversal,”
i.e., a sequence of distinct representatives of this sequence of sets, which then
gives us a vote for one of the manipulators. For every candidate ci such that
ci represents an occurrence of set Xj in the sequence, we know that xi,j > 0.
Subtract 1 from each such xi,j and recompute the surpluses. It follows from the
induction hypothesis that the remaining k manipulators can vote to make p a
winner.
Suppose for a contradiction that our sequence of sets does not fulfill the
marriage condition. Then there is a subcollection S of t sets such that the
union of these t sets, call it S, contains fewer than t elements.
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Note that
∑
ci∈S
∑
2≤j≤r xi,j < t(k + 1), which implies that
∑{xi,j | 1 ≤
i ≤ m, 2 ≤ j ≤ r, ci ∈ S,Xj ∈ S} < t(k + 1). But also note that, since xi,j = 0
for ci 6∈ Xj ,
∑{xi,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 2 ≤ j ≤ r, ci ∈ S,Xj ∈ S} = ∑{xi,j | 1 ≤ i ≤
m, 2 ≤ j ≤ r,Xj ∈ S} =
∑{mj(k + 1) | 2 ≤ j ≤ r,Xj ∈ S} = ∑{mj | 2 ≤ j ≤
r,Xj ∈ S}(k + 1) ≥ t(k + 1), which is a contradiction.
To conclude the proof of Theorem A.1, we will now show, by dynamic pro-
gramming, that M is computable in polynomial time for unary k, ℓ2, . . . , ℓr ≥ 0
and r bound by a fixed constant. This is easy:
1. M(k, ℓ2, . . . , ℓr) is true if and only if ℓ2 = · · · = ℓr = 0.
2. For ℓ ≥ 1, M(k, ℓ2, . . . , ℓr, s1, . . . , sℓ) if and only if there exist natural
numbers xℓ,j , 2 ≤ j ≤ r, such that:
(a)
∑
2≤j≤r xℓ,j ≤ k,
(b) xℓ,j ≤ ℓj,
(c) sℓ −
∑r
j=2 αjxℓ,j ≤ 0, and
(d) M(k, ℓ2 − xℓ,2, . . . , ℓr − xℓ,r, s1, . . . , sℓ−1).
B Results: Bribery Hardness
In this section, we state the hardness results obtained for bribery. These results
mirror the results for CCDV obtained in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The following
Section C then shows how to combine the CCDV results from Section 4, the
polynomial-time bribery results from Section 5.1, and the hardness results pre-
sented in Section 5.2 and the results here into a proof for our CCDV/bribery
dichotomy result, Theorem 3.1.
The proofs of the results in the current section can be found in Section F.2.
B.1 Bribery hardness for “many coefficients”
We now present the “bribery analogues” of the results obtained for CCDV in
Section 4.3, namely, we prove that bribery is NP-hard if the generator uses
“many” coefficients. In fact, in the same way as for CCDV, we obtain a re-
sult that is somewhat stronger, namely it covers all generators not of the form
(α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6). Among others, this includes generalizations of
k-veto for k ≥ 4 and k-approval for k ≥ 3.
The structure of the proof is slightly different to the corresponding situation
with CCDV presented in Section 4.3, since a more complex case distinction is
required. The reason is that we need “blocking candidates” in the front, making
the proof of Theorem B.1 only work if αm4 is “large” (this results in the need for
an additional case, namely Theorem B.3), and in order to implement the setup
votes, we sometimes rely on the generator providing 3 different coefficients (for
a suitably large number of candidates—note that due to the purity condition,
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the generator will then use at least 3 different coefficients for all but a finite
number of candidates).
We start with a generalization of 4-approval. This corresponds to Theorem E.2,
which generalizes 3-approval for CCDV. As mentioned above, for the bribery
case, generators that are “close to” 3-approval in the sense that the “bad” po-
sitions start with αm4 , form a specific case, which is covered in Theorem B.3,
and we rely on at least 3 coefficients. The two-coefficient case is covered in
Theorem B.4.
Theorem B.1. Let f be an polynomial-time uniform Q-generator with f(m) =
(αm1 , . . . , α
m
m) for each m, such that f uses at least three coefficients starting
from some m.
Then there is a polynomial-time computable function g such that
• g takes as input an instance M of F -3DM for some arbitrary F with
‖M‖ = n5 and produces an instance I of f -bribery with m = 3n candi-
dates,
• if αm4 > αm2n, and ‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖2+2‖X‖+2, then: M is a positive instance
of 3DM if and only if I is a positive instance of f -bribery.
Similarly, we now generalize 3-veto, i.e., state the bribery variant of Theorem E.3:
Theorem B.2. Let f be an polynomial-time uniform Q-generator with f(m) =
(αm1 , . . . , α
m
m) for each m, such that f uses at least three coefficients starting
from some m.
Then there is a polynomial-time computable function g such that
• g takes as input an instance M of F -3DM for some arbitrary F with
‖M‖ = n6 and produces an instance I of f -bribery with m = 3n candi-
dates,
• if αm2
3
m
> αmm−4, and ‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖3, then: M is a positive instance of 3DM
if and only if I is a positive instance of f -bribery.
Note that this veto-like case is a bit simpler than the corresponding approval-
related case above, since we do not need an additional position for the “blocking
candidate” at the beginning of the vote. Unlike for the CCDV case, we need
one other case with a “fixed” number of coefficients:
Theorem B.3. Let f be the generator (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, α6, α7) with
α3 > α4. Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
In the above Theorems B.1 and B.2, we used the fact that the generator
uses at least 3 coefficients, which allowed us to easily implement the required
setup votes. Hence we now need to treat the case that f uses only 2 distinct
coefficients, without loss of generality these coefficients are then 0 and 1.
5in this case, n is in fact the number of tuples inM , not the size of a binary representation.
6in this case, n is in fact the number of tuples inM , not the size of a binary representation.
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Theorem B.4. Let f be a generator such that αm3 > α
m
m−4 for some m, and
such that f only uses 2 coefficients. Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
Note that Theorem B.4 does not only cover generators of the form k-veto or
k-approval, but also systems we might call 110 -approval or
√
.-veto
The results from this section now allow to prove that, in fact, if we have
“many” different coefficients, i.e., a generator not of the form (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6),
then the bribery problem is NP-complete.
Corollary B.5. Let f be a polynomial-time uniform generator such that αm3 >
αmm−3 for some m. Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
B.2 Bribery hardness for “few coefficients”
The following result states that the hardness results for CCDV obtained in
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 as well as Corollary E.4 carry over to bribery:
Corollary B.6. Let f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α3) be a generator with α1 > α2 > α3.
If f is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then f -bribery can be solved in polynomial
time, otherwise, f -bribery is NP-complete.
We now state the bribery version of Theorem 4.5:
Theorem B.7. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3) with α1 > α2 > α3. Then f -bribery
is NP-complete.
The next result is the bribery analog of Theorem E.5:
Theorem B.8. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α5.
Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
The following two results show that the hardness results in Theorems E.6
and E.7 carry over to bribery as well:
Theorem B.9. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α6) with α1, α2 > α3 > α6. Then
f -bribery is NP-complete.
Theorem B.10. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α4.
Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
C Proof of CCDV and Bribery Dichotomy
Theorem 3.1. Let f be a pure, polynomial-time uniform generator. If f is
ultimately equivalent to one of the following generators, then f -CCDV and f -
bribery can be solved in polynomial time:
1. f1 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, 0) (3-veto),
2. f2 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (1-approval),
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3. f3 = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (2-approval),
4. for some α ≥ β ≥ 0, f4 = (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α) (this includes triviality,
1-veto, and 2-veto),
5. f5 = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
Otherwise, f -CCDV and f -bribery are NP-complete.
Proof. The polynomial-time cases for CCDV follow directly from the discus-
sion in Section 4.1. For bribery, the result for the first three cases follows
from Theorem F.1, the result for f4 is Theorem 5.3, and the result for f5 is
Theorem 5.2.
Therefore, let f be a pure generator not of this form.
If there is somem with αm3 > α
m
m−3, then NP-hardness follows from Theorem 4.7
and Corollary B.5.
Therefore, it suffices to consider the case that αm3 = α
m
m−3 for all m ≥ 6.
Therefore, f is of the form f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6).
We first consider the case α1 = α3, then f = (α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6). If
α3 = α4, then f is equivalent to (0, . . . , 0,−α,−β), i.e., a generator of the
form f4. Therefore, assume that α3 > α4. If α4 = α6, then f is equivalent
to 3-veto (generator f1). Therefore, assume that α3 > α4 > α6. In this case,
NP-completeness follows from Theorems 4.4 and 5.5.
Therefore, we can assume that α1 > α3. If α3 > α4, then NP-completeness
follows from Theorems 4.6.3 and B.10. Therefore, assume, for the remain-
der of the proof, that α1 > α3 = α4. Therefore, f is of the form f =
(α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α5, α6) with α1 > α3.
If α2 = α5, then the claim follows from Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 in the CCDV
case, and from Corollary B.6 for bribery. Therefore, we assume that α2 > α5.
We summarize: Using the results so far, we can assume that
f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 and α2 > α5.
Consider the case that α3 = α6, then f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3). If α1 = α2,
then f is 2-approval (generator f3), if α2 = α3, then f is 1-approval (gener-
ator f2). Therefore, we can assume that α1 > α2 > α3, in which case NP-
completeness follows from Theorems 4.5 and B.7.
Therefore, we assume that α3 > α6. We make a final case distinction.
• If α5 < α3, then f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α5. In
this case, hardness follows from Theorems 4.6.1 and B.8.
• Finally, assume that α3 = α5. In this case, f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α6),
with α1 > α3, α2 > α5 = α3, and α3 > α6. In this case, NP-completeness
follows from Theorems 4.6.2 and B.9, which then concludes the proof.
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D Auxiliary Results
In this section we state and prove two auxiliary results required for our hardness
proofs.
D.1 Realizing Scores
Throughout our hardness proofs, we will make use of the following result from Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014), which shows that, given a sufficiently uniform generator, we can con-
struct elections instances with any “reasonable” set of scores. This allows us to
construct the appropriate situations in our hardness proofs for both CCDV and
bribery.
Lemma D.1. Given a scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm), and for each c ∈ {1, . . . ,m−
1}, numbers ac1, . . . , acm in signed unary, and a number k in unary, we can
compute, in polynomial time, votes such that the scores of the candidates when
evaluating these votes according to the scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm) are as follows:
There is some o such that for each c ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, score(c) = o+∑mi=1 aciαi,
and score(c) > score(m) + kα1.
D.2 3DM and its variants
In this section, we formally define 3DM and prove that the restriction we use in
our hardness proofs in fact remains NP-complete.
3DM is the following problem: Given a multiset (in most cases, M will
be a set, however some proofs use the multi-set version of the problem) M ⊆
X × Y × Z with X , Y and Z pairwise disjoint sets of equal size such that each
s ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in exactly 3 tuples of M , decide whether there is a set
C ⊆ M with ‖C‖ = ‖X‖ such that each s ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in some tuple
of C (we also say that C covers s). From the problem definition, it follows that
‖M‖ = 3‖X‖.
The condition that each s appears in exactly 3 tuples is not standard; hence
we prove that this version of 3DM indeed remains NP-complete.
Proposition D.2. 3DM is NP-complete.
Proof. In ?, it is proved that the version of 3DM where every element may occur
in at most three triples of M is NP-complete. This immediately implies that
the version of 3DM where every element occurs in two or three triples of M is
NP-complete at well: If some element c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in exactly one
triple (x, y, z), we know that the triple (x, y, z) must be part of the cover. So
we can delete (x, y, z) and the elements x, y, and z, as well as all other triples
that contain one of x, y, z. We continue this process until either some element c
occurs in no triples (in which case we have a negative instance) or all elements
occur in two or three triples.
We now prove the actual result. For this, consider an instance of 3DM in
which every element occurs in two or three triples of M . Note that the number
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of elements in X that occur in two triples is the same as the number of elements
in Y that occur in two triples, which is the same as the number of elements in
Z that occur in two triples. Let t denote this number. We view these elements
as t elements of X×Y ×Z. Let (x, y, z) be such an element, i.e., x ∈ X , y ∈ Y ,
and z ∈ Z such that x, y, and z each occur in two triples in M . We add three
elements, x′ ∈ X , y′ ∈ Y , and z′ ∈ Z, and add the following four triples to M :
• (x, y′, z′),
• (x′, y, z′),
• (x′, y′, z),
• (x′, y′, z′).
We do this for all t triples and call the resulting set of triples M . Note
that every element occurs in exactly three triples in M . It is easy to see that
any cover in M ′ needs to contain (x′, y′, z′). Therefore, (x, y′, z′), (x, y, z′),
and (x′, y′, z) are not in the matching, which implies that a matching in M ′
restricted to the original elements is a matching in M .
In some reductions, the following variant of 3DM is useful: For a natural
number F ≥ 1, F -3DM is defined analogously to 3DM, except that every s ∈
X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in exactly 3F tuples of M . The question is still whether
there is a cover with size ‖X‖. Clearly, F -3DM is still NP-complete; in fact the
following slightly stronger claim holds:
Proposition D.3. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which, given a 3DM-
instance I and a natural number F ≥ 1 in unary, produces an F -3DM instance
I ′ such that I is a positive 3DM instance if and only if I ′ is a positive F -3DM
instance.
Proof. The proof follows from simply repeating every tuple in the set M from
the given instance I exactly F times. Clearly the question whether there is a
cover of any size is invariant under this transformation.
E Proofs of Results for CCDV
E.1 Relationships Between CCDV, CCDV∗, and CCAV
We now relate the complexities of f -CCDV∗ and f -CCAV. The problems are
very similar, but clearly, a reduction between them has to do more than simply
reversing all votes, since the f -CCDV problem is only the same as the dual (f)-
CCAV problem in a situation with a fixed set of scores of all candidates, when
the votes available for deleting/addition are obtained from each other by simply
reversing the order. To set up this situation—that is, to ensure that the relative
scores of all candidates are the same in both settings—the following result relies
on an implementation Lemma, and therefore requires a uniformity condition on
the generator f .
31
Proposition 4.1. For every generator f , f -CCDV∗ and dual (f)-CCAV are
polynomially equivalent.
Proof. We first show that f -CCAV reduces to dual (f)-CCDV∗. Hence, let an
f -CCAV instance be given, with registered voters R and unregistered voters U ,
favorite candidate p, and a number k of votes that may be added. The votes in
the dual (f)-CCDV∗ instance are constructed as follows:
• the deletable votes D contain, for each vote v ∈ U , the vote dual (v)
obtained from v by reversing the order of candidates in v. (Recall that we
regard the set of votes as multisets, i.e., each vote can appear more than
once.)
• the not deletable votes R are setup-votes to ensure that the relative points
of each candidate are the same as when counting only the votes in R
with regard to the original generator f . (These can be constructed using
Lemma D.1. Note that simply using the reversals of the votes in R does
not give the correct result, since we need the R-points with regard to f ,
but must use the generator dual (f) to achieve them.)
It is now obvious that adding (up to k) votes from U has the same effect as
deleting the corresponding deletable votes.
The proof of the converse direction is very similar: Let an f -CCDV∗ instance
be given, consisting of deletable votes D and fixed votes R. Then deleting a
vote v in D has the same effect as adding the vote dual (v). Hence, by using
the implementation Lemma in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 4.1,
we can reduce f -CCDV∗ to dual (f)-CCAV.
E.2 Polynomial-time results for CCDV
A direct consequence of Proposition 4.1 (together with the obvious fact that f -
CCDV always reduces to f -CCDV∗) is that the polynomial-time results obtained
in for CCAV carry over (using dualization). We therefore immediately get the
following result:
Theorem E.1. For the following generators, CCDV and CCDV∗ can be solved
in polynomial time:
1. f1 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, 0)
2. f2 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) (1-approval),
3. f3 = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (2-approval),
4. for some α ≥ β ≥ 0, f4 = (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α),
5. f5 = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
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Proof. All of these results follow directly from Proposition 4.1 and the results
in Hemaspaandra et al. (2014). We use the fact that the problem f -CCAV is
the same problem as f ′-CCAV when f ′ is obtained from f by an affine trans-
formation.
1. In this case, dual (f) is equivalent to (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
2. In this case, dual (f) is equivalent to (1, . . . , 1, 0)
3. In this case, dual (f) is equivalent to (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0)
4. In this case, dual (f) is equivalent to (α, β, 0, . . . , 0) for some α ≥ β ≥ 0.
5. In this case, dual (f) is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) (i.e., f is self-dual.)
E.3 Proof of Results from Section 4.3
In this section, we prove hardness of CCDV for all generators not of the form
(α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6).
E.3.1 Proof of Theorem E.2
This result covers the “approval-like” behavior of generators f satisfying αm3 >
αmm−3:
Theorem E.2. Let f be an polynomial-time uniform Q-generator with f(m) =
(αm1 , . . . , α
m
m) for each m. Then there is a polynomial-time computable function
g such that
• g takes as input an instance M of 3DM with ‖M‖ = n7 and produces an
instance I of f -CCDV with m = 3n candidates,
• if αm3 > αm2n, then: M is a positive instance of 3DM if and only if I is a
positive instance of f -CCDV.
Proof. Let M ⊆ X ∪ Y ∪ Z be a 3DM-instance. Let n = ‖M‖ = 3‖X‖, and let
X = {c1, . . . , c‖X‖}, Y = {c‖X‖+1, . . . , c2‖X‖}, and Z = {c2‖X‖+1, . . . , c3‖X‖}.
For c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z, let k(c) denote the unique number i with c = ci, and let r(c)
be defined as 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether c ∈ X , c ∈ Y , or c ∈ Z.
Without loss of generality, assume αmm = 0 (subtract α
m
m from every coeffi-
cient otherwise). Clearly, it suffices to consider the case α3m > α
m
2n, we produce
an arbitrary instance with the correct number of candidates otherwise. Hence,
there is some maximal t with αm3+t > α
m
2n. Since f is polynomial-time uniform,
t can be computed in polynomial time. Clearly, t < 2n − 3. We construct an
instance of f -CCDV with candidate set X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {b1, . . . , bt, p} ∪D where
p is the preferred candidate, the bi and di are additional blocking and dummy
7in this case, n is in fact the number of tuples inM , not the size of a binary representation.
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candidates, and D is a set of 2n − 3 dummy candidates. Since t < 2n − 3,
it follows that ‖D‖ ≥ 3. By construction, the total number of candidates is
m = 3n.
We first consider the case t ≥ 3. For each (x, y, z) ∈ M , we add a vote as
follows
b1 > · · · > bt > x > y > z > REST > Sxyz > p,
where Sxyz denotes the order sn > sn−1 > . . . s2 > s1, with candidates x,
y, and z replaced with dummy candidates from D (recall that ‖D‖ ≥ 3) and
REST contains the remaining dummy candidates. We say that this vote covers
the candidates x, y, and z, and we will call the votes obtained from M 3DM-
voters, to distinguish them from the votes introduced below that serve to set up
the necessary scores for our candidates. Using Lemma D.1, we add setup voters
ensuring that the relative scores of the candidates are as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(bi) = ‖X‖ · αmi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t},
• score(c) = αm
t+r(c) + (‖X‖ − 1)αmm−k(c) for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
• for each d ∈ D, score(d) is low enough to ensure that d cannot win the
election by deleting at most ‖X‖ voters.
We first show thatM is a positive 3DM-instance if and only if p can be made
a winner of the election by deleting at most ‖X‖ of the 3DM-voters. Below,
we then argue that the scores can be set up in such a way that, in order to
make p win with at most k deletions, the controller will always remove only
3DM-voters.
First assume that M is positive, i.e., there is a cover C ⊆ M with ‖C‖ =
‖X‖. We remove exactly the votes corresponding to the tuples in C, and show
that p wins the resulting election. Removing these voters changes the scores of
the candidates as follows:
• p is in the last position of all the removed votes; since αmm = 0, the score
of p remains 0,
• each bi is in position i in each of the ‖X‖ removed votes and hence loses
‖X‖ · αmi points, therefore bi ties with p,
• each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z loses αm
t+r(c) points from deleting the vote covering
c, as well as (‖X‖ − 1) · αm
m−k(c) points from the votes not covering c.
Therefore, the final score of c is 0 and c also ties with p.
Hence, after removing the votes corresponding to the cover, p is a winner of
the election as required.
For the converse, assume that p wins the election after deleting at most ‖X‖
3DM-votes. Deleting fewer than ‖X‖ of the 3DM-votes does not suffice, since
34
each bi must lose at least ‖X‖ · αmi points (note that αmi ≥ αm3+t > αm2n ≥ 0),
and loses exactly αmi points from each removed 3DM-vote. Therefore, exactly
‖X‖ 3DM-votes are removed. We prove that these votes correspond to a cover.
Assume that this is not the case, then there is some c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z such
that no vote covering c is removed. Then c appears in position m− k(c) in each
of the ‖X‖ removed votes, and therefore loses ‖X‖ · αm
m−k(c) points. Therefore,
the final score of c is
αmt+r(c)+(‖X‖−1)αmm−k(c)−‖X‖αmm−k(c) = αmt+r(c)−αmm−k(c) ≥ αmt+3−αm2n > 0 = score(p).
Hence, c beats p in the election, a contradiction.
To show that if p can be made a winner of the election, then M is a positive
3DM instance, it remains to show that the setup voters can be chosen such that,
in order to make p win with deleting at most k votes, the controller can remove
only 3DM-votes.
By construction, the candidates in B = {b1, . . . , bt}must lose as many points
as they gain in ‖X‖ many 3DM-votes. Therefore, it suffices to construct the
setup votes such that each of these votes gives fewer points to B than each 3DM-
vote (which give the maximal possible amount of points to B, as the candidates
from B are voted in the top t many spots).
Recall that in the proof of Lemma D.1, all setup votes introduced are ob-
tained from an arbitrary vote −→v init by cycling the vote −→v init and swapping the
position of two candidates in −→v init. We use the following initial vote −→v init in
the construction from Lemma D.1:
b1 > d1 > d2 > p > d3 > s1 > b2 > s2 > s3 > s4 > s5 > b3 > · · · > bt > REST,
where REST contains the remainder of the candidates from X ∪Y ∪Z ∪D.
Recall that t ≥ 3, and we can without loss of generality assume that n ≥ 6.
Clearly, by cycling the vote vinit and swapping the position of 2 candidates, no
vote is obtained that has all candidates from B among the top t+ 3 positions,
as required to give the maximal number of points to B (since αmt+3 > α
m
t+4),
and have the candidate p not occur in the first t+3 positions (since p does not
receive any points from the 3DM-votes).
This concludes the proof for the case t ≥ 3.
We now consider the case t ≤ 2. By choice of t, we know that αmt+3 >
αmt+4 = α
m
2n = α
m
2n (since m = 3n). Since m = 3n and t ≤ 2, we know that
‖D‖ = m− t − n− 1 = 2n− t − 1 ≥ 2n− 3, since m = 3n and t ≤ 2. We can
without loss of generality assume that n ≥ 3, and thus ‖D‖ ≥ n. For each tuple
(x, y, z) in the 3DM-instance, we produce a vote
x > y > z > b1 > · · · > bt > S \ {x, y, z} > D > p,
where S \ {x, y, z} contains these candidates in some arbitrary order. We
again call these voters 3DM-voters. Using Lemma D.1, we introduce additional
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setup votes ensuring that the relative scores of the relevant candidates are as
follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• for each relevant i, we have score(bi) = ‖X‖ · αm3+i,
• for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, we have score(c) = αm
r(c) + (‖X‖ − 1) · αmt+4,
• for each d ∈ D, d cannot win the election by deleting at most ‖X‖ voters.
In each of the 3DM-voters, the score of a candidate c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z that does
not appear in the first three positions is αmt+4, since α
m
t+4 = α
m
2n, and there are
at least n dummy candidates in D.
By the same reasoning as in the case t ≥ 3, one can easily see that the given
3DM-instance is positive if and only if p can be made a winner by removing
at most ‖X‖ 3DM-votes. It remains to show how to construct the setup votes
such that, when the controller removes at most ‖X‖ many votes, she can only
make p win the election when only 3DM-voters are removed.
With R, we denote the set of relevant candidates that p has to defeat, i.e.,
R = X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ t}. Similar as in the case t ≥ 3, removing
3DM-votes removes the maximal number of points from R, and from the setup
of the scores it is clear that it is necessary to remove as many points from R as
possible with removing ‖X‖ votes (namely, ‖X‖ · ((∑3+ti=1 αmi )+ (n− 3) ·αm4+t)).
Hence it suffices to construct the setup votes such that in each of these, the
candidates R have fewer points than (
∑3+t
i=1 α
m
i ) + (n− 3) · αm4+t.
Similarly to the above case, this can be achieved by choosing the initial setup
vote −→v init, as
s1 >  >  > s2 >  >  > s3 >  >  > · · · > sn >  > ,
where  is a placeholder for an arbitrary candidate not from X∪Y ∪Z. (Recall
that m = 3n, and n = ‖X ∪ Y ∪ Z‖, hence there are sufficiently many candi-
dates not from S filling the -positions.) Again, the setup votes are obtained
from −→v init by rotating an arbitrary number of positions and swapping at most
two candidates. Clearly, every vote obtained like this has at least one candidate
from R in a position i with i > 5 ≥ t+ 3, hence each of these votes gives fewer
points to the candidates from R than the votes introduced for the tuples of 3DM
above. As argued above, this concludes the proof.
E.3.2 Proof of Theorem E.3
The next result generalizes 4-veto. Note that for 3-veto, CCDV and bribery can
be solved in polynomial time due to Theorem E.1 and Theorem F.1, respectively.
Theorem E.3. Let f be an polynomial-time uniform Q-generator with f(m) =
(αm1 , . . . , α
m
m) for each m. Then there is a polynomial-time computable function
g such that
• g takes as input an instance M of 3DM with ‖M‖ = n8 and produces an
8again, n is in fact the number of tuples
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instance I of f -CCDV with m = 3n candidates,
• if αm2n > αmm−3, then: M is a positive instance of 3DM if and only if I is
a positive instance of f -CCDV.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem E.2, we assume that αmm = 0. Let M ⊆
X × Y × Z be a 3DM-instance with ‖M‖ = 3‖X‖ = n; we can without loss
of generality assume that n ≥ 4. We use the values r(c) and k(c) as defined
in the previous proof. We construct an f -CCDV instance with candidate set
X ∪ Y ∪ Z{b1, . . . , bn} ∪ {p} ∪D, where D is a set of dummy candidates with
‖D‖ = n− 1. By construction, this instance has 3m candidates. We again only
consider the case that αm2n > α
m
m−3. Since n ≥ 4, we know that ‖D‖ ≥ 3. For
each (x, y, z) ∈M , we introduce a voter voting as follows:
b1 > b2 > · · · > bn > Sxyz > REST > z > y > x > p,
where Sxyz is the sequence s1 > · · · > sn with each x, y, and z replaced by
a candidate from D (recall that ‖D‖ ≥ 3), and REST contains the remaining
candidates from D (in an arbitrary order). We again call these votes 3DM-votes.
Using Lemma D.1, we introduce additional votes ensuring that the scores
are as follows:
• for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have score(bi) = ‖X‖ · αmi ,
• for each c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z, we have score(c) = (‖X‖− 1)αm
n+k(c)+α
m
m−r(c)−1,
• score(p) = 0,
• for each candidate d ∈ D, the score is so low that d cannot win the election
when at most ‖X‖ votes are removed.
We show that in the resulting election, p can be made a winner by removing
at most ‖X‖ votes if and only ifM is a positive instance of 3DM. As in the proof
of Theorem E.2, we first show this claim where we only consider 3DM-votes,
and then argue how the setup votes can be constructed in such a way that the
controller will always remove 3DM-votes only.
First assume that M is a positive 3DM-instance, then is a cover C ⊆ M
with exactly ‖X‖ elements. We delete exactly the votes corresponding to C.
Then:
• each bi loses exactly ‖X‖·αmi points, therefore having 0 points afterwards,
• each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z loses exactly αmm−r(c)−1 points from the one vote
corresponding to a tuple covering c, and (‖X‖−1)αmn+k(c) points from the
remaining ‖X‖ − 1 votes, hence c ends up with 0 points,
• the score of p is not affected, since αmm = 0, hence p still has 0 points after
the votes are removed.
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Therefore, all relevant candidates tie and p is indeed a winner of the election
as claimed.
For the converse, assume that p can be made a winner with removing at
most ‖X‖ of the 3DM-votes. Since b1 must lose ℓ · αm1 many points, at least
‖X‖ votes must be removed, hence exactly ‖X‖ votes are removed. Let C be
the subset ofM corresponding to the removed votes, we claim that C is a cover.
Assume indirectly that C is not a cover, then, since ‖C‖ = ‖X‖, there is some
c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appearing in at least two tuples of C. Then, c loses at most
(‖X‖ − 2) · αmn+k(c) + 2αmm−r(c)−1
many points, hence c has at least
(‖X‖ − 1)αm
n+k(c) + α
m
m−r(c)−1 − (‖X‖ − 2) · αmn+k(c) − 2αmm−r(c)−1 = αmn+k(c) − αmm−r(c)−1
≥ αm2n − αmm−3
> 0,
which is a contradiction. Hence C is a cover as required.
It remains to show how to construct the setup votes such that the deletion
of any set of ‖X‖ many votes which does not only include 3DM-votes fails to
ensure that p wins the election. For this, it suffices to construct the initial vote−→v init in the following way:
 >  > b1 >  >  > b2 >  >  > · · · > bn−1 >  >  > bn
(recall that m = 3 · n, hence there are enough candidates to fill the -
positions). Since all votes in the setup votes are constructed from −→v init by
swapping two candidates or cycling, each setup vote has a candidate bi in one
of the last four votes. Since αmm−3 < α
m
2n ≤ αmn , this implies that in a non-3DM-
vote, the sum of the scores of B = {b1, . . . , bn} is lower than in a 3DM-vote
(where each bi receives at least α
m
n points). From the above it follows that in
order for p to win, the set B must lose exactly ℓ times the number of points
they lose when deleting a single 3DM-vote. Hence in order to make p win with
deleting at most ℓ votes, only 3DM-votes can be deleted. This completes the
proof.
E.3.3 Proof of Theorem 4.7
We now combine the above two results to show that all “many coefficients”-cases
of CCDV are NP-complete:
Theorem 4.7. Let f be a polynomial-time pure generator such that αm3 > α
m
m−3
for some m. Then f -CCAV is NP-hard.
Proof. Clearly, if the condition is true for some m0, then it remains true for
each m ≥ m0. We use a reduction from 3DM. LetM be an instance of 3DM, let
n = ‖M‖, let m = 3n. Without loss of generality, assume n ≥ 4, and 3n ≥ m0.
Since αm3 > α
m
m−3, we know that α
m
3 > α
m
2n or α
m
2n > α
m
m−3 must hold, and
we can determine, in polynomial time, which of these cases holds, since f is
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polynomial-time uniform. Let g be the reduction from Theorem E.2 in the first
case, and the one from Theorem E.3 in the second case. In both cases, f(M)
is a positive instance of f -CCDV if and only if M is a positive 3DM-instance.
Since g is polynomial-time computable, this completes the proof. In both cases,
g(M) is
E.4 Proofs of Results from Section 4.2.1
In this section, we present hardness results for CCDV that are obtained by a di-
rect reduction from CCDV∗. In these cases, the difficulty in the reduction is the
construction of an appropriate set of “setup votes” that mirror the “undeletable”
voters from the CCDV∗-instance. Since in CCDV, no voter is immune from dele-
tion, we need to setup these votes such that they are “unattractive” to delete.
More precisely, in the two following proofs deleting one of the “setup votes”
will immediately imply that the intended candidate p does not win the election,
since deleting such a vote implies a “chain reaction” of further required deletions
that exceeds the budget available to the controller. In the proof of Theorem 4.2,
we use an exponential construction (but only logarithmically many steps of it
in order to be able to perform the reduction in polynomial time), whereas the
proof of Theorem 4.3 relies on a simpler linear construction.
E.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Theorem 4.2. Let f = (α, 0, . . . , 0,−β) be a generator with 1 ≤ α < β. Then
f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. The dual generator to f is dual (f) = (β, 0, . . . , 0,−α). Due to Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014), dual (f)-CCAV is NP-complete, hence due to Proposition 4.1, f -CCDV∗
is NP-complete as well. Therefore, it suffices to prove that f -CCDV∗ reduces
to f -CCDV.
Let I ′ be an instance of f -CCDV∗, consisting of a set D of deletable votes,
a set R of votes that cannot be deleted, a preferred candidate p, and a budget k
indicating the number of votes that the controller can delete. In the following,
we will denote a vote c1 > c2 > · · · > cn−1 > cn simply as c1 > cn, since
the remaining candidates all receive 0 points from this vote and thus are not
relevant. Without loss of generality, we assume the following:
• There is no deletable vote of the form p > c for any candidate c: Clearly,
the controller will never delete such a vote, hence we can move all these
votes to the set R of undeletable votes without changing whether the
instance is positive.
• There is no deletable vote of the form c > p for any candidate c: Since
β > α, removing such a vote (letting p gain at least β points against every
candidate) is more profitable for the controller than removing any vote of
the form (c1 > c2) (letting p gain α points against a single candidate).
We therefore can simply remove all of these votes and decrease the budget
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accordingly. (In case that there are more votes of this kind than the
budget allows, the controller will only remove such votes, and we can use
the obvious greedy strategy to decide the instance I ′, producing a fixed
positive/negative instance I depending on whether I ′ is positive/negative.)
As discussed earlier, the task in a reduction from f -CCDV∗ to f -CCDV is
to convert the undeletable votes from I ′ into votes that give the same relative
points to all relevant candidates, and which cannot be removed by the controller
when trying to make p win the election with deleting at most k votes.
Without loss of generality, we assume that gcd(α, β) = 1, and hence there
are natural numbers A,B with 1 = A · α − B · β.9 Therefore, it suffices to
show how to construct votes that the controller will not remove, and which
add α points, respectively remove β points from the candidates (relative to p).
Adding 1 point to a candidate c 6= p then can be implemented by using A groups
of votes that each add α points to c, and then B groups of votes each removing
β points. We can assume that indeed all candidates must gain points relatively
to p by adding votes of the form p > c for arbitrary candidates c to ensure that
p has a sufficient headstart over the remaining candidates. Clearly, such votes
will never be deleted by the controller. We do this at least twice to ensure that
score(p) ≥ 2α.
To reduce the score of a candidate c by β, we simply add a vote x > c for a
fresh dummy candidate x, who appears in the 0-point segment of all other votes.
Then, clearly, p beats x, and this vote will not be deleted by the controlled.
Therefore, it remains to show how to construct a set of votes that add α points
to a candidate c 6= p and which the controller will not delete. Since p gets 0
points in all of the deletable votes (and in all votes we introduce below that
replace the votes in R), we can compute the score score(p) that p will have in
the final election (this score is unaffected by the controller’s delete actions).
Since p never appears in the last position of any vote, p gains either α or 0
points from any present vote. Hence, score(p) = Npα for some natural number
Np ≥ 2. In the following, let B =
⌈
β
α
⌉
. Since α < β, we know that B ≥ 2. To
let a candidate c 6= p gain α points relatively to p, we proceed as follows: We
add dummy candidates d1, . . . , dℓ with ℓ =
⌈
log β
α
(k)
⌉
+2 by placing them in the
positions awarding 0 points of every existing vote. These dummy candidates are
only used for the process of adding α points to c once, further additions in the
sequel (even to the same candidate c) use a new set of dummy candidates. We
now add a single vote c > d1, which lets c gain α points relative to p. It remains
to add votes ensuring that the vote c > d1 cannot be removed by the controller.
These votes will set up the scores of the dummy candidates as follows:
• Each di for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1 ties with p,
• the only way to make di lose points (relative to p) is to remove votes
di > di+1, which then lets di+1 gain points (relative to p).
9From numbers C and D with 1 = C ·β−D ·α, we obtain A and B as required as A = tβ−D
and B = tα− C for sufficiently large t such that these numbers are positive.
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Hence removing the vote c > d1, which lets d1 gain β points relative to p
requires the controller to remove votes of the form d1 > d2, which in turn lets
d2 gain β points for each removal, this process continues for di with i ≥ 2. In
this way, removing c > c1 triggers a “chain reaction” of additional necessary
removals. We will set up the votes in such a way that this process forces the
controller to remove more votes than her budget allows. This implies that, in
fact, she cannot remove the vote c > d1, as required. The numbers of votes
we need to add in each step, and consequently the numbers of points that the
candidates gain, will essentially grow exponentially in β
α
. Since the controller
can only remove a polynomial number of votes, we only require logarithmically
many steps, yielding a construction that can be performed in polynomial time
as required. Specifically, we use the following votes:
induction start: score of d1 After adding the vote c > d1, d1 currently has
−β points.
• We add (α − 1) many votes of the form x > d1 for a fresh (as
above—the controller will never delete these votes as p strictly beats
x) dummy candidate x, which further decrease the score of d1 to
−αβ (this ensures that the score of d1 is a multiple of α, recall that
score(p) = Npα).
• We add N1 := Np + β votes of the form d1 > d2, each of these
votes lets d1 gain α points relative to p, hence after this score(d1) =
−αβ + (Np + β)α = Npα = score(p).
induction step: score of di+1 After adding the Ni votes di > di+1, di+1 cur-
rently has −Niβ points.
• Add mi+1 := (−Ni) mod α many votes x > di+1 for a new dummy
candidate x as above, then di+1’s score is −(Ni +mi+1)β. By con-
struction, this is a multiple of α, namely − ⌈Ni
α
⌉
αβ = −Miα (with
Mi =
⌈
Ni
α
⌉
β). Since mi+1 ∈ {0, . . . , α − 1}, the number of votes
added in this step is bounded by the constant α.
• AddNi+1 := Np+Mi votes of the form di+1 > di+2, then score(di+1) =
Npα = score(p).
We claim that the number of votes added is polynomial in the input. For
this, we first prove inductively that Ni ≤ Np + iβNpBi−1 for all relevant i.
induction start Since Np ≥ 1, we have that N1 = Np + β ≤ Np + βNpB0,
hence for i = 1 the claim holds.
induction step Due to the above, Ni+1 = Np +Mi = Np +
⌈
Ni
α
⌉
β. We have
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Ni+1 = Np +
⌈
Ni
α
⌉
β
≤ Np +
(
Ni
α
+ 1
)
β
= Np + β +Ni
β
α≤ Np + β +NiB
≤ Np + (Ni + β)B (B ≥ 1)
≤ Np +
(
Np + iβNpB
i−1 + β
)
B (induction)
≤ Np +
(
NpB
i−1 + iβNpB
i−1 + βBi−1
)
B (Bi−1 ≥ 1)
= Np + (Np + iβNp + β)B
i
≤ Np + (Npβ + iβNp)Bi (Npβ ≥ Np + β, as Np, β ≥ 2)
= Np + (i+ 1)NpβB
i,
as required. This completes the induction.
We now use the above bound on Ni to show that in fact, only polynomially
many votes are added. Recall that ℓ =
⌈
log β
α
(k)
⌉
+ 2. Therefore, for each
relevant i, we have that
Ni ≤ Np + iβNpBi−1
≤ Np + ℓβNpBℓ (i ≤ ℓ)
≤ Np + ℓβNpB
log β
α
(k)
B3 (definition of ℓ)
= Np + ℓβNpk
log β
α
(B)
B3. (alogb(x) = xlogb(a) for all a, b, x)
To see that alogb(x) = xlogb(a) for all a, b, x, recall that loga(x) =
logb(x)
logb(a)
.
From this we get logb(x) = loga(x) · logb(a) = loga(xlogb(a)), and by building
the power to the base a, this finally implies xlogb(a) = alogb(x) as required.
Since Np, ℓ, and k are polynomial in the instance and α, β, and B are
constant, this shows that the number of votes required is in fact polynomial in
the size of I ′.
We now show that the above construction in fact enforces that in a successful
control operation, only votes corresponding to deletable votes from the instance
I ′ are removed. First note that, since all dummy candidates tie with p, and
there is no removable vote in which p gains any points, the controller will not
remove any vote of the form di > di+1, unless she also removes a vote of the form
c > d1 as introduced above. Hence it suffices to show that when the controller
removes a vote c > d1, she cannot make p win the election by removing at most
k − 1 additional votes.
We prove inductively that if the controller removes the vote c > d1, then she
has to remove at least
(
β
α
)i
votes of the form di > di+1.
induction start. If the controller removes the vote c > d1, then candidate d1
(who previously tied with p) gains β points against p. The only way to
make d1 lose these points again (relative to p) is to remove votes that vote
d1 ahead of p. The only votes of this form are the votes d1 > d2, removing
such a vote lets d1 lose α points against p. Therefore, at least
β
α
such
votes must be removed.
induction step. Assume that inductively,
(
β
α
)i
votes of the form di > di+1
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are removed. Each such removal lets di+1 gain β points against p, hence
di+1 gains at least
(
β
α
)i
β = β
i+1
αi
points. Since di+1 initially ties with p,
the controller must remove votes to let di+1 lose this number of points.
Analogously to the case i = 1, the only votes allowing this are votes of the
form di+1 > di+2, each removal of one of these votes lets di+1 lose α points
relative to p. Therefore, at least 1
α
βi+1
αi
=
(
β
α
)i+1
must be removed, as
claimed.
In particular, for i = ℓ− 1, we show that the controller must remove at least
k votes of the form di > di+1, which she cannot do, as her budget is k, and
she already removed the vote c > d1. To see that at least k such votes must
be removed, recall that, due to the above, at least
(
β
α
)i
of these votes must be
removed. With i = ℓ− 1, it follows that
(
β
α
)ℓ−1
=
(
β
α
)⌈log β
α
(k)+1
⌉
≥
(
β
α
)log β
α
(k)+1
≥ k,
as required. This concludes the proof.
E.4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Theorem 4.3. Let f = (α, 0, . . . , 0,−β) be a generator with α > β ≥ 1. Then
f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. We proceed analogously to the case α < β treated in Theorem 4.2. With
the exact same argument as in that proof, it suffices to show how to add a group
of votes that add α many points to a candidate c 6= p. We can again assume
that p gains 0 points in the deletable votes from the original instance I ′, since
the hardness proof for dual (f)-CCAV of Hemaspaandra et al. (2014) ensures
this. We can therefore also assume, just as above, that score(p) = Npα for some
Np ∈ N, and this score does not change with the controller’s actions.
To let a candidate c 6= p gain α points relative to p, we again add dummy
candidates and a single vote c > d1. Again, if the controller removes this
setup-vote, d1 gains β points (relative to p). Since α > β, the construction is
much simpler than in the proof of Theorem 4.2: Removing a single vote d1 > d2
suffices to make d1 lose the points gained by removing the vote c > d1 is removed.
Analogously, removing a single vote di+1 > di+2 undoes the β points gained by
di+1 when a vote di > di+1 is removed. Instead of the exponential/logarithmic
process of the proof of Theorem 4.2, we thus can use a simple linear chain:
We add k + 1 dummy candidates, and can easily ensure that each of them has
scores as required. In the proof of Theorem 4.2, this lead to a number of votes
approximately
(
β
α
)i
in step i. Since in the current proof, β
α
is smaller than 1,
we do not run into a similar exponentially-growing process this time.
To be more precise, we add dummy candidates d1, . . . , dk+1, and votes as
follows:
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• a single vote c > d1,
• for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Ni many votes di > di+1 (the number Ni ≥ 1 will
be defined below).
We set up the scores of di such that di currently does not beat p, but does
so after gaining β points, i.e.,
Npα− β < score(di) ≤ Npα.
Hence, the score of di must lie in an interval of length β (recall that β < α).
This can be achieved by adding votes as follows:
induction start: score of d1. After adding the vote c > d1, the score of d1 is
−β. To ensure that the score is at least Npα−β+1, we add N1 := Np+1
votes of the form d1 > d2; after this, the score of d1 is Npα + α − β. We
then add (constantly many) votes of the form x > d1, each removing β
points from d1, to move the score of d1 into the required interval of length
β.
induction step: score of di+1. After adding the Ni many votes di > di+1,
the score of di+1 is −Niβ. To ensure that the score is at least Npα−β+1,
we add Ni+1 =
⌈
Ni
β
α
⌉
+Np votes of the form di+1 > di+2. We then add
constantly many votes of the form x > di+1 to move the score of di+1 into
the interval of length β.
It is easy to see that the number of added votes is polynomial: N1 is clearly
polynomial, and Ni+1 is essentially obtained from Ni by multiplying with
β
α
< 1
and adding Np.
It remains to show, analogously to the proof of Theorem 4.2, that the con-
troller cannot remove the vote c > d1 and still make p win with at most k − 1
further deletions. By construction, removing the vote c > d1 lets d1 beat p in
the election, and to reduce the score of d1 relative to p, a vote d1 > d2 must
be removed. Inductively, when a vote di > di+1 is removed, then di+1 gains β
points relative to p and thus beats p, hence a vote di+1 > di+2 must be removed.
Therefore, a sequence of k many votes must be removed in addition to the vote
c > d1, and hence the controller cannot remove the vote c > d1.
E.4.3 Corollary for f = (α, 0, . . . , 0, β)
As a corollary of the above two results, we obtain the following characterization
of the complexity of CCDV for all generators of the form (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α3):
Corollary E.4. Let f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α3) be a generator with α1 > α2 > α3.
If f is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then f -CCDV can be solved in polynomial
time, otherwise, f -CCDV is NP-complete.
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Proof. Clearly, f is equivalent to a generator of the form (α, 0, . . . , 0,−β) with
α, β > 0. The polynomial-time case follows from Theorem E.1. If f is not
equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then f also is not equivalent to (1, 0, . . . , 0,−1).
Therefore, α 6= β, and NP-hardness follows from Theorem 4.2 or Theorem 4.3.
E.5 Proofs of Results from Section 4.2.2
We now present the proofs of the results stated in Section 4.2.2, these are hard-
ness proofs for CCDV obtained essentially by a reduction from those CCDV∗-
cases that arise in the hardness proofs of the corresponding dual generators
from Hemaspaandra et al. (2014). (The proof of Theorem 4.4 is contained com-
pletely in the main paper.)
E.5.1 Proof of Theorem 4.5
Theorem 4.5. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3) with α1 > α2 > α3. Then f -CCDV
is NP-complete.
Proof. We can equivalently write f as f = (0,−α5,−α1, . . . ,−α1) with 0 <
α5 < α1. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.4 above, we consider the hard-
ness proof of dual (f)-CCAV from Hemaspaandra et al. (2014), where dual (f) =
(α1, . . . , α1, α5, 0). Their proof gives us, by applying Proposition 4.1, a hardness
proof of f -CCDV∗ with a reduction from 3DM.We consider the votes introduced
and points required by this reduction. Following the proof in Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014), and reversing the votes according to 4.1, we obtain the following reduc-
tion. The set of candidates is the same as in the above proof of Theorem 4.4.
For each Si = (x, y, z) ∈ M , the following four votes are introduced (we only
state the first two candidates, since the remaining ones all get the same number
of points from the vote):
• Si > S′i > . . . ,
• x > Si > . . . ,
• y > Si > . . . ,
• z > S′i > . . . .
The scores of the candidates before the controller’s action are as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(c) = α1 for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
• score(Si) = min(α1, 2(α1 − α5)) for each Si ∈M ,
• score(S′i) = α1 − α5 for each Si ∈M .
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We obtain these scores by adding votes of the form x > d > . . . and d > x >
. . . for a relevant candidate x and a dummy candidate d, where we use a new
dummy candidate d each time, who gets −α1 points from all remaining votes.
Clearly, using enough “setup”-votes, we can ensure that the dummy candidates
do not win the election.
The budget awarded to the controller by the reduction from Hemaspaandra et al.
(2014) is n + 2k = 5k. We now show that, in order to make p win the
election when the scores are as constructed above and with at most 5k re-
movals of voters, the controller will only remove that have candidates from
X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {Si, S′i | Si ∈M} in the first two positions. This then in particu-
lar shows that none of the above-introduced setup votes can be deleted by the
controller. For this, we fix a set V of votes with ‖V ‖ ≤ 5k such that p wins the
election after the votes in V are removed. Then, in particular, after removing
the votes in V , p is not beaten by any candidate in X ∪ Y ∪ Z. We define the
following sets:
• Let C1 contain all candidates c ∈ X ∪Y such that V contains at least one
vote having c in the first position,
• let C2 contain the remaining candidates fromX∪Y , i.e., C2 = (X∪Y )\C1.
• Similarly, let D1 contain all c ∈ Z such that V contains at least one vote
having c in the first position,
• let D2 contain the remaining candidates from Z, i.e., D2 = Z \D1.
• Similarly, let E1 contain all Si ∈M such that V contains at least one vote
having Si in the first position,
• let E2 contain the remaining sets Si, i.e., E2 =M \ E1.
By definition and since X ∩ Y = ∅, we obtain
• ‖C1‖+ ‖C2‖ = ‖X‖+ ‖Y ‖ = 2k,
• ‖D1‖+ ‖D2‖ = ‖Z‖ = k,
• ‖E1‖+ ‖E2‖ = ‖M‖ = 3k.
In each of the 5k votes in V , only at most the first two candidates gain
points relative to p, hence there are only 10k positions in V which ensure that
after removing, the candidates lose points relative to p. Since each S′i must lose
points relative to p (as α1 > α5), there are at most 7k positions in V available
for candidates in C1 ∪C2 ∪D1 ∪D2 ∪ E1 ∪ E2.
Each candidate in X ∪ Y ∪ Z must lose α1 > α1 − α5 points relative to p;
each candidate Si must lose min(α1, 2(α1 −α5)) > α1− α5 points relative to p.
Therefore, each of these candidates that does not appear in the first position of
a vote in V must appear in the second position of at least two votes from V .
Since there are only 7k positions available for these candidates, it follows that
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‖C1‖+ 2‖C2‖+ ‖D1‖+ 2‖D2‖+ ‖E1‖+ 2‖E2‖ ≤ 7k.
With ‖C2‖ = 2k−‖C1‖, ‖D2‖ = k−‖D1‖ and ‖E2‖ = 3k−‖E1‖, we obtain
‖C1‖+ 2(2k − ‖C1‖) + ‖D1‖+ 2(k − ‖D1‖) + ‖E1‖+ 2(3k − ‖E1‖) ≤ 7k
⇔ 4k − ‖C1‖+ 2k − ‖D1‖+ 6k − ‖E1‖ ≤ 7k
⇔ 12k − (‖C1‖+ ‖D1‖+ ‖E1‖) ≤ 7k
⇔ ‖C1‖+ ‖D1‖+ ‖E1‖ ≥ 5k.
Clearly, we also have ‖C1‖+ ‖D1‖ + ‖E1‖ ≤ 5k, since in the 5k votes from
V , only 5k first positions are available. Therefore, we obtain
‖C1‖+ ‖D1‖+ ‖E1‖ = 5k.
Let e∗2 denote the number of votes in V that have a candidate of the form
Si in the second position. Since every candidate from E2 appears in no first
position of any vote in V , but must lose more than α1 − α5 points relatively to
p, every such candidate must appear in the second position of at least two votes
in V . Therefore, e∗2 ≥ 2‖E2‖. We show that, in fact, the two values are equal.
Therefore, assume indirectly that ‖E2‖ < 12e∗2. We consider the number of
relevant positions in votes in V that the candidates in X∪Y ∪Z∪{Si | Si ∈M}
require. Since each candidate in E1 requires one first position, and additionally,
e∗2 second positions are required by the candidates of the form Si, and each
of the 3k candidates S′i required at least one position, and we assumed that
e∗2 > 2‖E2‖, and we know from above that ‖C1‖ + ‖D1‖ + ‖E1‖ = 5k, the
number of positions required is at least
‖C1‖+ 2‖C2‖+ ‖D1‖+ 2‖D2‖+ ‖E1‖+ e∗2 + 3k
> ‖C1‖+ 2(2k − ‖C1‖) + ‖D1‖+ 2(k − ‖D1‖) + ‖E1‖+ 2‖E2‖+ 3k
= ‖C1‖+ 2(2k − ‖C1‖) + ‖D1‖+ 2(k − ‖D1‖) + ‖E1‖+ 2(3k − ‖E1‖) + 3k
= 4k − ‖C1‖+ 2k − ‖D1‖+ 6k − ‖E1‖+ 3k
= 15k − (‖C1‖+ ‖D1‖+ ‖E1‖)
= 15k − 5k
= 10k.
Since there are only 10k positions available, we have a contradiction. There-
fore, it follows that ‖E2‖ = 12e∗2 as claimed.
We now consider all votes in V having a candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y in the first
place. Since such a c only needs to lose α1 points against p, and there is a
vote available (introduced by the reduction above) that has a second relevant
candidate (namely Si with c ∈ Si) in the second position, and these are the
only votes introduced whose deletion removes points from both c and another
relevant candidate, we can without loss of generality assume that each vote in
V having c ∈ X ∪ Y in the first position has a vote Si in the second position.
In particular, this implies that ‖C1‖ ≤ e∗2, therefore
1
2
‖C1‖ ≤ 1
2
e∗2 = ‖E2‖.
From ‖C1‖ + ‖D1‖ + ‖E1‖ = 5k and ‖D1‖ ≤ ‖Z‖ = k, we obtain ‖C1‖ +
‖E1‖ ≥ 4k, with ‖E1‖ = 3k−‖E2‖, this implies ‖C1‖−‖E2‖ ≥ k. Since we know
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‖C1‖−‖E2‖ ≤ 12‖C1‖ from the above, it follows that k ≤ ‖C1‖−‖E2‖ ≤ 12‖C1‖,
and therefore ‖C1‖ ≥ 2k. Since ‖C1‖ ≤ ‖X ∪ Y ‖ = 2k, this implies
‖C1‖ = 2k and ‖E2‖ ≥ 1
2
‖C1‖ = k.
From ‖C1‖ + ‖D1‖ + ‖E1‖ = 5k, we thus get ‖D1‖ + ‖E1‖ = 3k, thus
‖D1‖ + (3k − ‖E2‖) = 3k, i.e., ‖D1‖ = ‖E2‖. Since ‖D1‖ ≤ ‖Z‖ = k, we get
k ≤ ‖E2‖ = ‖D1‖ ≤ k, i.e.,
‖D1‖ = ‖E2‖ = k.
Therefore, we know that ‖C1‖ = 2k, ‖C2‖ = 2k − ‖C1‖ = 0, ‖D1‖ = k,
‖D2‖ = k−‖D1‖ = 0, ‖E1‖ = 3k−‖E2‖ = 2k, and ‖E2‖ = k. Therefore, these
candidates together use
‖C1‖+2‖C2‖+‖D1‖+2‖D2‖+‖E1‖+2‖E2‖ = 2k+2·0+k+2·0+2k+2k = 7k
relevant positions in V . Since the candidates of the form S′i each use at least
one relevant position of a vote in V , this means that all 10k relevant positions in
V are used by relevant candidates. In particular, the controller cannot remove
any vote that has a dummy candidate in a relevant position, and thus does not
remove any of the setup votes. This concludes the proof.
E.6 Proofs of Results from Section 4.2.3
In this section we prove Theorem 4.6, the proof is split up into the three distinct
types of generators covered by the theorem.
Theorem E.5. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α5.
Then f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. For the proof, we normalize to α3 = 0 and write f as f = (α1, α2, 0, . . . , 0,−α4,−α5,−α6)
with α1 > 0 > −α5 ≥ −α6 and α2 ≥ 0 > −α5.
We again reduce from 3DM. Let M ⊆ X × Y × Z be a be 3DM-instance.
We construct an instance of f -CCDV as follows:
• The candidate set is X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {p} ∪ D, where p /∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z is the
preferred candidate, and D is a set of dummy candidates,
• For each (x, y, z) ∈M , we add a vote
(z > d1 > REST > d2 > y > x),
where d1, d2 ∈ D, and REST contains the remaining candidates in an
arbitrary order (all of these candidates obtain 0 points from this vote).
We call these votes 3DM-votes.
• We introduce additional setup-votes (see below for details) such that the
relative points of the candidates gained from the 3DM-votes and the setup
votes are as follows:
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– score(p) = 0
– 0 < score(z) ≤ α1 for each z ∈ Z (note that α1 > 0)
– −2α5 < score(y) ≤ −α5 for each y ∈ Y (note that α5 > 0),
– −2α6 < score(x) ≤ −α6 for each x ∈ X (note that α6 ≥ α5 > 0),
– no dummy candidate d ∈ D can win the election when at most ‖X‖
votes are deleted.
We first show that M is positive if and only if p can be made a winner of
the election with deleting at most ‖X‖ of the 3DM-votes. In the following, we
identify elements of M and the corresponding 3DM-votes.
First assume that M is a positive instance, i.e., there is some C ⊆ M with
‖C‖ = ‖X‖ such that each c ∈ X∪Y ∪Z appears in exactly one tuple of C. We
show that p wins the election when exactly the votes in C are removed. Since,
by construction, the dummy candidates cannot win the election, it suffices to
show that no candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z beats the preferred candidate p. Hence
let c be such a candidate. Since C is a cover, exactly one 3DM-vote in which
c gets a non-zero amount of points is removed. Depending on whether c ∈ Z,
c ∈ Y , or c ∈ X , c gains α1, −α5, or −α6 points from this vote. We make a
case distinction.
• If c ∈ Z, then c loses α1 points. Since score(c) ≤ α1 initially, the final
score of c is at most 0, and hence c does not beat p.
• If c ∈ Y , then c loses −α5 points, i.e., gains α5 points. Since score(c) ≤
−α5 initially, c also does not beat p.
• If c ∈ X , then analogously, c gains α6 points; since score(c) ≤ α6, c does
not beat p.
Therefore, p wins the election as required.
For the converse, assume that there is a set C of at most ‖X‖ 3DM-votes
such that removing C makes p win the election. Since initially, each candidate
z ∈ Z beats p, each such z must lose points relatively to p. The only way for
z to lose points relative to p by removing 3DM-votes is to remove a 3DM-vote
that has z in the first position. Therefore, C contains, for each z ∈ Z, a tuple
covering z. To show that C also covers each x ∈ X and each y ∈ Y , it suffices,
due to cardinality reasons, to show that no such candidate appears in two tuples
(or votes) from C.
First assume that some y ∈ Y appears in two votes from C. Then y gains
2α5 points. Since the score of y is initially more than −2α5, this implies that the
final score of y is more than 0, hence y beats p, a contradiction. Analogously,
if x ∈ X appears in two votes from C, then x gains 2α6 points, beating p, we
again have a contradiction.
This proves that M is a positive instance if and only if p can be made a
winner by deleting at most ‖X‖ of the 3DM-votes. It remains to show how
we can add votes that set up the relative points of the candidates as required
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above, and which will not be deleted by the controller. We first compute the
points that the candidates obtain from the 3DM-votes; we denote these points
with score3DM (c) for a candidate c.
• p gets 0 points from each 3DM-vote, hence score3DM (p) = 0,
• each c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z appears in exactly 3 tuples from C, and gains 0 points
in all other 3DM-votes. Therefore:
– For each z ∈ Z, score3DM (z) = 3α1,
– for each y ∈ Y , score3DM (y) = −3α5,
– for each x ∈ X , score3DM (x) = −3α6.
Therefore, relative to p, each z ∈ Z must lose 2α1 points. We achieve this
by adding two votes of the form
p > d1 > REST > d2 > d3 > d4,
where d1, d2, d3, d4 are dummy candidates from D, and REST contains all
remaining candidates. This lets p gain 2α1 points relatively to all candidates
in X ∪ Y ∪ Z, and hence each z ∈ Z beats p by exactly α1 points, as required.
However, these votes let p also gain points against each candidate in X ∪Y . To
get the required relative scores for these candidates, we proceed as follows:
• After adding the votes above, p beats each y ∈ Y by 3α5+2α1 points. To
ensure that −2α5 < score(y) ≤ −α5 (relative to p), we add the following
votes:
– votes of the form y > d1 > REST > d2 > d3 > d4 (with REST and
dummies as previously) let y gain α1 points relative to p.
– votes of the form d1 > d2 > REST > d3 > y > d4 let y lose α5
points relative to p.
Combining these steps allows to adjust the relative score of y to lie in the
required interval of length α5.
• For x ∈ X , we proceed analogously by adding votes letting x gain α1
points and votes removing α6 points, which allow the relative score of x
to lie in the required interval of length α6.
To ensure that the dummy candidates cannot win the election, we use the
following construction: For each occurrence of a dummy candidate in one of
the above votes, we use a fresh dummy candidate (who gets 0 points in all
other votes). Then each dummy candidate has at most α1 (absolute) points;
the preferred candidate p has 2α1 (absolute) points. Therefore, no dummy
candidate can beat p.
It remains to show that if the CCDV instance is positive, i.e., if p can be
made a winner of the election with at most ‖X‖ deletions, then p can in fact
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be made a winner with deleting at most ‖X‖ 3DM-votes. To see this, note that
each candidate z ∈ Z must lose points relative to p. This is only possible by
removing votes in which z is votes ahead of p. By construction, this is the case
only for the 3DM-votes. Since in each 3DM-vote, only a single candidate from
Z is voted ahead of p, it is necessary to remove at least ‖X‖ 3DM-votes in order
to make p win the election. Therefore, if p is made a winner of the election by
removing at most ‖X‖ votes, then in fact exactly ‖X‖ votes are removed, and
each of them is a 3DM-vote. This concludes the proof.
Theorem E.6. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α6) with α1, α2 > α3 > α6. Then
f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. We can write f more simply as f = (α, β, 0, . . . , 0,−γ) with 0 /∈ {α, β, γ}.
We proceed very similarly to the proof of Theorem E.5; we again reduce from
3DM, with an instance given asM ⊆ X×Y ×Z with ‖M‖ = 3k, ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ =
‖Z‖ = k be given, where each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in exactly 3 tuples of M ,
and the sets X , Y , and Z are pairwise disjoint. We construct an instance of
f -CCDV as follows:
For each (x, y, z) ∈ M , we add a vote x > y > REST > z, where REST
includes all remaining candidates. We use setup votes to ensure that the relative
scores are as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(x) = α for each x ∈ X ,
• score(y) = β for each y ∈ Y ,
• score(z) = −γ for each z ∈ Z.
We show that the 3DM instance is positive if and only if p can be made
a winner of the election with deleting at most k of the 3DM-votes. We again
identify the elements of M and the votes obtained from them.
First assume that C ⊆M is a cover with size k. Then removing all votes in
C lets each candidate in X lost α points, each candidate in Y loses β points,
and each candidate in Z gains γ points, hence all candidates tie and p wins the
election.
Therefore, it suffices to show that we can in fact construct setup votes achiev-
ing the required relative points that will not be deleted by the controller. This is
simpler than the corresponding proof in Theorem E.5: Since the controller must
ensure that each x and each y loses points relative to p, it suffices to achieve
the required points with setup votes that each vote at most one candidate from
X ∪Y ahead of p. Since 2k of these candidates (that is all of them) need to lose
points against p, and removing a 3DM-vote results in 2 of them losing points
against p, and removing each setup votes allow at most one candidate from
X ∪ Y to lose points against p, the controller can only remove votes that vote
two candidates from X ∪ Y ahead of p, i.e., the setup votes.
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Now, it is easy to adjust the scores of every relevant candidate c ∈ X∪Y ∪Z
with votes voting c in the first, second, or last spot, all other relevant candidates
in the 0-point sequence, and dummy candidates in the two remaining positions.
To ensure that the dummy candidates cannot win the election, we use es-
sentially the same idea as in the proof of Theorem E.5: We use a fresh dummy
candidate for each position where one is needed, and then increase the points of
each relevant candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {p} with a vote voting c first, dummy
candidates in the second and last positions, and all remaining candidates in the
0-points sequence. These votes do not change the relative points of the relevant
candidates, and ensure that the dummies cannot win the election. Due to the
same reasoning as above, these votes cannot be removed by the controller, hence
this concludes the proof.
Theorem E.7. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α4.
Then f -CCDV is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from 3DM. Hence letM ⊆ X×Y ×Z be a 3DM-instance. Due
to cardinality reasons,M is positive if and only if there are ‖X‖ many elements
from M which pairwise differ in all components. From M , we construct an f -
CCDV instance as follows: The set of candidates is X ∪ Y ∪Z ∪ {p}∪ {B}∪D,
where B is a new candidate, and D is a set of dummy candidates. For each
element (x, y, z) in M , we introduce a vote
B > d > REST > x > y > z,
with d ∈ D, and where REST contains the remaining candidates in an
arbitrary order (all of these candidates receive α3 points from this vote). Again,
we call these votes 3DM-votes. For a candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, we define
r(c) = 4, 5, 6 if c ∈ X,Y, Z, respectively. We now set up the relative points of
the candidates as follows:
• scorefinal(p) = 0,
• scorefinal(B) = ‖X‖(α1 − α3),
• −2(α3 − αr(c)) < scorefinal(c) ≤ −(α3 − αr(c)) (note that r(c) ≥ 4 and
hence α3 > α4 ≥ αr(c)).
(recall that these points are relative to the score of p, and hence can be
negative). We show below how votes can be added to the election instance such
that
• the resulting scores relative to p are as indicated above,
• to make p a winner with deleting at most ‖X‖ votes, the controller can
only delete votes introduced from the elements in the 3DM instance (we
will call these 3DM-votes in the sequel).
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We claim that the 3DM-instance is positive if and only if p can be made a
winner of the election with deleting at most ‖X‖ of the 3DM-votes.
First assume that the instance is positive, and let C ⊆ M be a cover with
‖C‖ = ‖X‖. Then deleting exactly the votes that correspond to the cover
changes the scores of the candidates (relative to p) as follows:
• in each of these votes, B gets α1 points and p gets α3 points. Hence,
relative to p, B loses ‖X‖(α1 − α3) points, and hence ties with p.
• for each candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, there are ‖X‖ − 1 votes in C in which
c gets α3 points, and there is a single vote in which c gets αr(c) points,
while p gets α3 points in all of these votes. Hence, relative to p, each c
gains α3 − αr(c) points. Since c’s initial score is at least α3 − αr(c) below
p, this means that c does not beat p.
Now assume that p can be made a winner of the election by removing at most
‖X‖ of the 3DM-voters. Since B must lose ‖X‖(α1−α3) points, and removing
each vote lets B lose α1−α3 points against p (and α1−α3 > 0), it follows that
exactly ‖X‖ voters must be removed. Let C ⊆ M be the set corresponding to
the removed voters. We show that C is a cover. Assume indirectly that this
is not the case, then, since ‖C‖ = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖, there is some element
c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪Z appearing in at least two of the tuples in C. Then with deleting
the votes corresponding to C, c gains at least 2(α3 − αr(c)) points against p.
Since c initially has more than −2(α3−αr(c)) points, this means that c beats p
in the final election, a contradiction. Therefore, C is indeed a cover as claimed.
It remains to show how to add votes to the above-introduced 3DM-votes
such that the required scores are achieved, and such that any successful control
action removing at most ‖X‖ many votes will only delete 3DM-votes. We will
achieve the latter property by only adding votes that give the candidate p at
least as many points as the candidate B. Since in order to at least tie with B,
the preferred candidate p must gain at least ‖X‖(α1−α3) points against p, and
gains exactly α1 − α3 points when a vote as above is deleted, this ensures that
in order to ensure that B does not beat p, only 3DM-votes can be deleted.
Hence it remains to show how to implement the above scores (relative to p)
be adding to the above 3DM-votes only votes in which p gets at least as many
points as B. For this, we first compute the points (relative to p) that each
candidate gets from the above 3DM-votes.
• In each of the 3‖X‖ votes from the 3DM-instance, B gains α1−α3 points
relative to p. Hence B’s initial relative score is
score3DM (B) = 3‖X‖(α1 − α3).
• Since each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z appears in exactly 3 tuples from M , each such
candidate c loses α3−αr(c) points relative to p in 3 of the 3DM-votes, and
ties with p in the remaining ones. Therefore, c’s initial relative score is
score3DM (c) = −3(α3 − αr(c)).
53
Therefore, we need to adjust the scores as follows:
adjusting the relative score between B and p. Relatively to p, the candi-
date B must lose
score3DM (B)−scorefinal(B) = 3‖X‖(α1−α3)−‖X‖(α1−α3) = 2‖X‖(α1−α3)
points. We achieve this by adding 2‖X‖ votes of the form
p > d > REST > d > d > d,
where d stands for (different) dummy candidates from D, and REST
contains other candidates in an arbitrary order. Each of these votes lets
p gain α1 − α3 points against B; hence the 2‖X‖ votes have the required
effect. Note that these votes also add 2‖X‖(α1 − α3) points to p relative
to each candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z.
adjusting the relative score between c and p, for c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z. Recall that
each of these c lost 2‖X‖(α1 − α3) points relative to p by the above ad-
justment. We adjust the points of c in two steps:
1. We add votes to ensure that, relative to p, c has at least −2(α3 −
αr(c)) + 1 points. Since c lost 2‖X‖(α1 − α3) against p in the above
step, this means c has to gain at least
−2(α3 − αr(c)) + 1 + 2‖X‖(α1 − α3)− score3DM (c)
= −2(α3 − αr(c)) + 1 + 2‖X‖(α1 − α3)− (−3(α3 − αr(c)))
= −2α3 + 2αr(c) + 1 + 2‖X‖(α1 − α3) + 3α3 − 3αr(c)
= 2‖X‖(α1 − α3) + α3 − αr(c) + 1
points, we denote this number with δc. To let c gain at least δc points,
we add ⌈ δc
α1−α3
⌉ (recall that α1 − α3 > 0) votes of the form
c > d > REST > d > d > d,
where again the d stand for (different) dummy candidates, and REST
contains all remaining candidates.
2. after the above step, the score of c may be larger than allowed—
recall that we need the score of c to lie in the interval of length
α3 − αr(c) between −2(α3 − αr(c)) and −(α3 − αr(c)). To move the
score into this interval, we repeatedly add votes that have all relevant
candidates except c in a position gaining α3 points, c in the position
gaining αr(c) points, and four dummy candidates in the remaining
positions (such a vote lets c gain α3 − αr(c) points against p). This
ensures that c’s score is in the required interval.
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By construction, p gets at least as many points as B in the above votes,
and the required points are achieved. It remains to show that the dummy
candidates are indeed irrelevant, i.e., never win the election when at most
‖X‖ votes are removed. To achieve this, we set up the above votes as
follows: We use a fresh dummy candidate for each position where a dummy
candidate appears in the above votes, and position the dummy candidate
in the block receiving α3 points in the remaining votes. Since p gets at least
α3 points in every vote, this means that for each dummy candidate d, there
is at most one vote in which she can gain points against p, and in this vote,
she gains α1−α3 points. However, in the 2‖X‖ votes introduced above to
adjust the relative score of p and B, the candidate p gains 2‖X‖(α1−α3)
points against the dummy candidates. Hence, when at most ‖X‖ votes are
removed, p still has a headstart of at last (‖X‖− 1)(α1−α3) against each
dummy candidate, and therefore strictly beats each dummy candidate.
This concludes the proof.
Now, Theorem 4.6 easily follows from the above results:
Theorem 4.6. f -CCDV is NP-complete in the following cases:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α5.
2. f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α6) with α1, α2 > α3 > α6.
3. f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α4.
Proof. This follows from the above results, since point 1 is exactly the generator
covered in Theorem E.5, point 2 is Theorem E.6, and point 3 is Theorem E.7
F Proofs of Results for Bribery
F.1 Proofs for Polynomial-Time Bribery Results
In this section, we prove our polynomial-time bribery results. The following
result for approval and veto-like scoring systems were obtained by Lin (2012):
Theorem F.1. • Bribery for k-approval is in P if k ≤ 2 and NP-hard
otherwise,
• Bribery for k-veto is in P if k ≤ 3 and NP-hard otherwise.
For the remaining polynomial-time bribery cases, note that, while corre-
sponding (with duality) to the generators which give rise to a CCAV-problem
in polynomial time, we cannot use arguments analogous to the results presented
in Section E.1: Due to the additional manipulation step, the bribery problem
is conceptually more complex than CCAV or CCDV. Therefore, algorithms for
bribery tend to be more complicated than their CCAV or CCDV counterparts.
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F.1.1 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We now prove our first polynomial-time algorithm for bribery:
Theorem 5.2. (1, 0, . . . , 0,−1)-bribery is in polynomial time.
Proof. Let C be the set of candidates, let V be the set of voters, let p be the
preferred candidate, and let k be the number of voters we can bribe. Without
loss of generality, assume we bribe exactly k voters and that all bribed voters
rank p first.
There are three types of voters. Let V1 be the set of voters that rank p last,
let V2 be the set of voters that rank p neither first nor last, and let V3 be the set
of voters that rank p first. Note that bribing a voter in V1 to vote p > · · · > d is
at least as good as bribing a voter in V2 to vote p > · · · > d, which is at least as
good as bribing a voter in V3 to vote p > · · · > d. Thus we will assume that we
bribe as many V1 voters as possible, followed by as many V2 voters as possible,
followed by V3 voters. Since we assume that all k bribed voters put p first, we
also know p’s score after bribery.
We consider the following three cases.
1. k ≤ ‖V1‖. We bribe k voters from V1. In this case, we view bribery as
deleting k voters followed by a manipulation of k voters. Greedily delete
a > · · · > p for highest scoring a, and update the scores. Repeat until k
voters are deleted. Then add p > · · · > a for highest scoring a. Update the
scores until k voters have been added (or use the manipulation algorithm
for this case).
2. k ≥ ‖V1‖+ ‖V2‖.
In this case bribery will make p will be a winner, since after bribery p will
be ranked first by every voter.
3. ‖V1‖ < k < ‖V1‖+ ‖V2‖.
We bribe all voters in V1 and k − ‖V1‖ of the V2 voters.
We again view bribery as deletion followed by manipulation. Delete all V1
voters. In V2, deleting a voter a > · · · > b corresponds to transferring a
point from b to a. After deleting k voters, the deleted voters will be bribed
to rank p first and to rank some other candidate last. After deleting V1,
score(c) = scoreV2∪V3(c). For every V2 voter a > · · · > b that is deleted,
transfer one point from a to b. For every bribe p > · · · > d, delete a point
from d. There are exactly k bribes. After bribery, score(p) = ‖V3‖+k and
the score of every other candidate needs to be at most score(p) = ‖V3‖+k.
All this immediately translates into the following min-cost network flow
problem.
(a) We have a source s and a sink t.
(b) We have a node c for every candidate c 6= p.
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(c) For every c ∈ C − {p}, there is an edge from s to c with capacity
scoreV2∪V3(c) and cost 0. We will be looking for a flow that saturates
all of these edges. This ensures that candidates start with right score.
(d) For every c ∈ C − {p}, there is an edge from c to t with capacity
‖V3‖ + k and cost 0. This ensures that after bribery, the score of
every other candidate will be at most the score of p.
(e) For every a, b ∈ C −{p} there is an edge from a to b with cost 1 and
capacity the number of voters that vote a > · · · > b. These are the
only edges with a cost. The min cost will correspond to the number
of V2 voters that we bribe. So, we need to min cost to be k − ‖V1‖.
(f) We have now handled the CCDV part of the problem. All that is
left to do is to handle the manipulation part. So, we are adding k
vetoes to candidates other than p. Add a node v to handle the vetoes.
There is an edge from v to t of capacity k and cost 0 so that there
will be at most k vetoes. And for every candidate c ∈ C − {p}, we
add an edge from c to v of capacity k and cost 0.
It is easy to see that there is a successful bribery of and only if there is
a network flow with value
∑
c∈C−{p} scoreV2∪V3(c) and min cost at most
k − ‖V1‖.
F.1.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3
The following polynomial-time bribery proof uses the manipulation algorithm
from the proof of Theorem A.1.
Theorem 5.3. Let α ≥ β ≥ 0. Then bribery for (0, . . . , 0,−β,−α) is solvable
in polynomial time.
Proof. Let C be the set of candidates, let V be the set of voters, let p be the
preferred candidate and let k be the number of voters we can bribe.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.2, we partition V into V1, V2, and V3. V1
consists of all voters in V that rank p last, V2 consists of all voters in V that
rank p second-to-last, and V3 consists of the remaining voters. In the proof of
Theorem 5.2, it was important that bribing a V1 voter is always at least as good
as bribing a V2 voter, which is always at least as good as bribing a V3 voter.
This is not always the case here, as we will see in Example F.2:
Example F.2. This example shows that we sometimes need to bribe V3 voters.
It also shows that it is sometimes better to bribe a V3 voter than it is to bribe
a V2 voter. It also shows that an optimal bribery is not always an optimal
deletion followed by an optimal manipulation, since an optimal deletion would
never delete a voter from V3. We will use the scoring rule (0, . . . , 0,−1,−3).
Let C = {p, a, b, c, d, e, f} and let V consist of the following voters:
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• one (V2) voter voting · · · > p > a,
• one (V2) voter voting · · · > p > b,
• one (V2) voter voting · · · > p > c,
• two (V3) voters voting · · · > e > f , and
• two (V3) voters voting · · · > f > e.
The scores of the candidates are as follows.
• score(d) = 0,
• score(p) = score(a) = score(b) = score(c) = −3, and
• score(e) = score(f) = −8.
We can make p a winner by bribing one of the V3 voters to vote p > · · · > d.
But it is easy to see that we can not make d a winner by bribing a V2 voter,
wlog, the voter voting · · · > p > a, since in the bribed election, the score of p
will be at most −2, and so both a and d must be in the last position of the bribed
voter.
And the following example shows that it is sometimes better to bribe a V2
voter than it is to bribe a V1 voter.
We will use the scoring rule (0, . . . , 0,−2,−3). Let C = {p, a, b, c, d} and let
V consist of the following voters:
• one (V1) voter voting · · · > a > p,
• one (V1) voter voting · · · > b > p,
• one (V1) voter voting · · · > c > p,
• one (V2) voter voting · · · > p > d,
• one (V3) voter voting · · · > b > d,
• one (V3) voter voting · · · > d > b,
• one (V3) voter voting · · · > c > d,
• one (V3) voter voting · · · > d > c,
• two (V3) voters voting · · · > a > d, and
• one (V3) voter voting · · · > d > a.
The scores of the candidates are as follows.
• score(p) = −11,
• score(a) = −9,
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• score(b) = score(c) = −7, and
• score(d) = −17.
We can make p a winner by bribing the V2 voter to vote p > · · · > b > c. But
if we bribe one of the V1 voters, p’s score will be at most -10, and so the bribed
voter needs to put a, b, and c in the two last positions, which won’t fit.
Though we may need to bribe V3 voters, we will show that the number of
such voters is limited.
Claim F.3. If there is a successful bribery, then there is a successful bribery
where we bribe at most X voters from V3.
Proof. If k ≥ ‖V1‖ + ‖V2‖, we can make p a winner by bribing all voters from
V1 ∪ V2 to put p first.
So, let k < ‖V1‖+‖V2‖. Consider a successful bribery that bribes a minimum
number, ℓ, of V3 voters and suppose for a contradiction that ℓ > X . If we bribe
a voter from V3, then for every c 6= p, surplus(c) decreases by at most α. If we
bribe a voter · · · > a > p to vote p > · · · > a, then for every c 6= p, surplus(c)
decreases by at least α. So, it is never better to bribe a voter from V3 than it
is to bribe a voter from V1. It follows that all voters from V1 are bribed and so
there are at least ℓ+ 1 unbribed V2 voters.
Let r = ⌈α/β⌉. If there exists a set C′ ⊆ C − {p} of r candidates and a set
V ′ ⊆ V2 of r unbribed voters such that for every c ∈ C′ there is a voter in V ′
voting · · · > p > c, then deleting these r unbribed V2 voters will not increase
the surplus of any candidate (since p’s score goes up by rβ ≥ α), while deleting
any r voters from V3 will not decrease the surplus of any candidate. It follows
that bribing the r unbribed V2 voters instead of r V3 voters will give a successful
bribery, which contradicts the assumption of minimality.
Let s ≥ r be the number of unbribed V2 voters. By the argument above,
there is a candidate a such that at least s′ = ⌈ s
r−1⌉ of these voters vote · · · p > a.
Note that if we delete such a voter, the surplus of all candidates other than a
does not increase. In addition, note that if we delete a V3 voter, the surplus
of none of the candidates decreases. After deletion of one of these unbribed V2
voters that vote · · · > p > a, the score of p will be −(s− 1)β and the score of a
will be at most −(s′ − 1)α. We need −(s− 1)β ≥ −(s′ − 1)α. It is easy to see
that this is true if we choose
s ≥ (α/β − 1)(r − 1)
α/β − r + 1 .
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Here is the derivation:
s ≥ (α/β − 1)(r − 1)
α/β − r + 1 ⇒
(α/β − r + 1)s ≥ (α/β − 1)(r − 1)⇒
(α/β − r + 1)s
r − 1 ≥ (α/β − 1)⇒
(α/β)s
r − 1 −
(r − 1)s
r − 1 ≥ (α/β − 1)⇒
(
s
r − 1 − 1)
α
β
≥ (s− 1)⇒
(s′ − 1)α ≥ (s− 1)β.
It follows that bribing one V2 voter voting · · · p > a instead of bribing any
V3 voter is also a successful bribery, which contradicts the minimality of the
number of V3 voters that are bribed.
We will now adapt the dynamic programming approach from the proof of
Theorem A.1 to show that bribery is in polynomial time.
Consider an instance of the bribery problem. Let C be the set of candidates,
let V be the set of voters, let p be the preferred candidate and let k be the number
of voters we can bribe. Let C − {p} = {c1, . . . , cm}.
Note that by Claim F.3, there exists a successful bribery if and only if there
exists a set V ′3 ⊆ V3 and nonnegative integers k1 and k2 such that k1+k2+‖V ′3‖ ≤
k and ‖V3‖ ≤ X and there exists a successful bribery that bribes k1 V1 voters, k2
V2 voters, and all voters in V
′
3 . We assume that every bribed voter puts p first.
Without loss of generality, we assume that k ≤ ‖V ‖ and that k = k1+k2+‖V ′3‖.
Let surplus(c) = score(c) − score(p). Let V1,i be the set of V1 voters that
rank ci next to last and let V2,i be the set of V2 voters that rank ci last.
Note that if there exists a successful bribery that bribes k1 V1 voters, k2 V2
voters, and all voters in V ′3 , then for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exist nonnegative
integers xi (the number of times ci is ranked next to last by a bribed voter), yi
(the number of times that ci is ranked last by a bribed voter), zi (the number
of bribed voters in V1,i), and wi (the number of bribed voters in V2,i) such that:
1. xi + yi ≤ k,
2. zi ≤ ‖V1,i‖,
3. wi ≤ ‖V2,i‖,
4.
∑
1≤i≤m xi = k,
5.
∑
1≤i≤m yi = k,
6.
∑
1≤i≤m zi = k1,
7.
∑
1≤i≤m wi = k2, and
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8. surplus(ci)− surplusV ′
3
(ci)− βxi − αyi + βzi + αwi ≤ 0.
We define the following Boolean predicate M . M(k, kβ, kα, k
′
1, k
′
2, s1, . . . , sℓ)
is true if and only if for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, there exist natural numbers xi, yi, zi,
and wi such that
1. xi + yi ≤ k,
2. zi ≤ ‖V1,i‖,
3. wi ≤ ‖V2,i‖,
4.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ xi = kβ ,
5.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ yi = kα,
6.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ zi = k
′
1,
7.
∑
1≤i≤ℓ wi = k
′
2,
8. si − βxi − αyi + βzi + αwi ≤ 0.
Note that if there is a successful bribery that bribes k1 V1 voters, k2 V2 voters,
and all voters in V ′3 , thenM(k, k, k, k1, k2, surplus(c1)−surplusV ′
3
(c1), . . . , surplus(cm)−
surplusV ′
3
(cm)) is true. We will now show that the converse is true as well: For
k = ‖V ′3‖+k1+k2, ifM(k, k, k, k1, k2, surplus(c1)−surplusV ′
3
(c1), . . . , surplus(cm)−
surplusV ′
3
(cm)) is true then there exists a successful bribery that bribes k1 V1
voters, k2 V2 voters, and all voters in V
′
3 .
If k = ‖V ′3‖ then zi = wi = 0 and the correctness of the claim follows from
the proof of Theorem A.1.
Now suppose that the claim holds for k ≥ ‖V ′3‖. We will show that it also
holds for k + 1. So, let k + 1 = k′1 + k
′
2 + ‖V ′3‖ and for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let
xi, yi, zi, wi be natural numbers such that:
1. xi + yi ≤ k + 1,
2. zi ≤ ‖V1,i‖,
3. wi ≤ ‖V2,i‖,
4.
∑
1≤i≤m xi = k + 1,
5.
∑
1≤i≤m yi = k + 1,
6.
∑
1≤i≤m zi = k
′
1,
7.
∑
1≤i≤m wi = k
′
2, and
8. surplus(ci)− βxi − αyi + βzi + αwi ≤ 0.
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If k′1 > 0, let r be such that zr > 0 and we will bribe a V1,r voter. Let
k1 = k
′
1 − 1 and let k2 = k′2. Otherwise, k′2 > 0 and we let r be such that
wr > 0 and we will bribe a V2,r voter. Let k1 = k
′
1 and let k2 = k
′
2 − 1. Let
X = {i | xi+yi = k+1}. Note that ‖X‖ ≤ 2. Let i, j be such that i 6= j, xi > 0,
yj > 0, and X ⊆ {i, j}. Let the bribed voter vote · · · > ci > cj . Subtract 1
from xi and yj and zr (or wr) and recompute the surpluses. It follows from the
induction hypothesis that we can bribe k1 V1 voters, k2 V2 voters, and all voters
in V ′3 to make p a winner.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 5.3, we will now show, by dynamic pro-
gramming, thatM is computable in polynomial time for unary k, kβ , kα, k
′
1, k
′
2 ≥
0. This is easy:
1. M(k, kβ , kα, k
′
1, k
′
2) is true if and only if kβ = kα = k
′
1 = k
′
2 = 0.
2. For ℓ ≥ 1, M(k, kβ , kα, k′1, k′2, s1, . . . , sℓ) if and only if there exist natural
numbers xℓ, yℓ, zℓ, and wℓ such that:
(a) xℓ + yℓ ≤ k,
(b) xℓ ≤ kβ ,
(c) yℓ ≤ kα,
(d) zℓ ≤ k′1,
(e) wℓ ≤ k′2,
(f) sℓ − βxℓ − αyℓ + βzℓ + αwℓ ≤ 0, and
(g) M(k, kβ − xℓ, kα − yℓ, k′1 − zℓ, k′2 − wℓ, s1, . . . , sℓ−1).
F.2 Proofs for Bribery Hardness Results
This section contains our hardness proofs for bribery, except for Theorem5.5,
which is proven in the main paper.
F.2.1 Proof of Corollary B.6
Corollary B.6. Let f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α3) be a generator with α1 > α2 > α3.
If f is equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), then f -bribery can be solved in polynomial
time, otherwise, f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. This follows in a similar way as Corollary E.4 for CCDV: The polynomial-
time result for the generator (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) follows from Theorem 5.2, the hard-
ness results follow from modifications of the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3,
which give hardness results for the corresponding CCDV-cases, as follows:
We use essentially the same reduction, except that we construct an instance
Ib of f -bribery instead of the f -CCDV instance Ic constructed in the above
proofs. Ib uses the same budget k for the controller as the instance Ic. In the
following, we will see bribery as deletion of voters followed by manipulation
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(keeping in mind that bribery is not necessarily optimal CCDV followed by
optimal manipulation). In particular, we will refer to the bribed votes (i.e., the
votes the bribed voters cast after the bribery) as manipulation votes.
The differences between the CCDV and the bribery setting and the resulting
differences between Ic and Ib are as follows:
• Without loss of generality, all manipulation votes place the preferred can-
didate p in the first position. Therefore, p’s final score is kα higher than
in the CCDV setting, but still is a multiple of α, and the value Np can be
computed by the reduction.
• The manipulation votes vote k (not necessarily distinct) candidates in the
position giving −β points. We say that the votes veto these candidates.
In order to handle this additional strategic freedom of the controller, we
proceed as follows:
– We add additional candidates b1, . . . , bk, who each need to lose β
points against p in order to not beat p.
– The scores of b1, . . . , bk are set using the same “setup-vote” strategy
as used in the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 above.
– We show that, in order to make p win the election, the controller must
use at least one veto for each of the candidates b1, . . . , bk. To see this,
recall that each of these candidates must lose β points against p. If
no veto is used for some bi, then bi needs to lose these points via
deleting a vote of the form bi > d1. As shown in the proofs of the
CCDV results, this causes a “chain reaction” of additional removals
which requires more removals than allowed by the budget k, we have
a contradiction. Therefore, at least one veto must be used to ensure
that bi does not beat p.
– Since at least one veto must be used for each bi, we can without loss
of generality assume that the controller uses one veto for each bi and
no deletions, since this suffices to ensure that bi does not beat p.
– Therefore, we know that the manipulation votes vote p > b1, p > b2,
. . . , p > bk, and the remainder of each proof is identical to the
respective CCDV case—with a value Np increased by k in comparison
with the CCDV case, as explained above.
This completes the proof.
F.2.2 Proof of Theorem B.7
Theorem B.7. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3) with α1 > α2 > α3. Then f -bribery
is NP-complete.
Proof. In this case, the proof is an easy addition modification to the proof of
Theorem 4.5. Without loss of generality, we assume that α3 = 0. Clearly, all
manipulation votes will be of the form
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p > x > REST
for the preferred candidate p and a dummy candidate x (recall that the proof
of Theorem 4.5 introduces dummy candidates that can never win the election,
we reuse these candidates here). Since the controller’s budget is 5k, p will gain
5kα1 points against every relevant candidate from the manipulation votes. It
therefore suffices to let all other relevant candidates gain 5kα1 additional points
using the setup mechanism described in the proof of Theorem 4.5.
F.2.3 Proof of Theorem B.8
Theorem B.8. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α5.
Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. We follow the recipe from Section 5.2 to obtain the result from the hard-
ness result for CCDV proved in Theorem E.5. As in the proof of that theorem,
we write f as f = (α1, α2, 0, . . . , 0,−α4,−α5,−α6) with α1 > 0 > −α5 ≥ −α6
and α2 ≥ 0 > −α5. Applying the recipe requires the following:
• The reduction from 3DM uses the same transformation as above, i.e., for
a triple (x, y, z), we generate a 3DM vote z > d1 > REST > y > x.
• Clearly, all manipulators will vote p > d > REST > r1 > r2, where d is a
dummy candidate and r1 and r2 are relevant candidates.
• Therefore, p gains ‖X‖α1 points (where X is the set from the 3DM in-
stance, recall that ‖X‖ is the controller’s budget in the reduction from
Theorem E.5, it will also be her budget in the current proof), and the
relevant candidates lose ‖X‖(α5 + α6) points.
• We therefore increase the points of each candidate in X∪Y ∪Z by ‖X‖α1,
compared to the reduction from Theorem E.5.
• Additionally, we introduce two candidatesB5 andB6, such that scorefinal(Bi) =
‖X‖(α1 + αi). The intention is that these candidates tie with p if they
are voted in the last two positions in all manipulator votes.
This is realized as follows:
• The precise required points of all candidates (as always, relative to p) are
as follows:
– scorefinal(z) = (‖X‖+1)α1, so each z must lose exactly α1 points to
tie with p (recall that p gains ‖X‖α1 points from the manipulation
votes),
– scorefinal(y) = ‖X‖α1 − α5, so each y may gain exactly α6 points
from the deletion of one tuple in which x is voted in the second to
last position,
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– scorefinal(x) = ‖X‖α1 − α6, so each x may gain exactly α6 points
from the deletion of one tuple in which x is voted last,
– scorefinal(Bi) = ‖X‖(α1 + αi) for i ∈ {5, 6}.
The proof of the CCDV result (Theorem E.5) relies on the fact that each z
can only lose points relative to p by removing 3DM votes. In order to keep this
feature in our current bribery setting, we need to ensure that B5 and B6 are
voted in the last two positions of every manipulation vote, so that no candidate z
can lose points by being voted in one of the last two positions in a manipulation
vote. Therefore, there are two main issues to handle:
1. we need to ensure that each z ∈ Z gain sufficiently many points from the
3DM votes, namely ‖X‖α1 points more than in the CCDV reduction,
2. we must ensure that Bi gains enough points from votes that the controller
cannot delete.
For the first issue, we use the following idea: Using Proposition D.3, we first
transform the given 3DM-instance into an F -3DM instance, with a suitably
chosen F (see below). Recall that in F -3DM, the size of the desired cover is still
‖X‖, which is the budget of the controller in Theorem E.5, and which will also
be her budget in the current proof. The only relevant difference is that each
c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z now appears in exactly 3F tuples from M . This results in the
following scores from the 3DM votes:
• score3DM (z) = 3Fα1,
• score3DM (y) = −3Fα5,
• score3DM (z) = −3Fα6.
By choosing F sufficiently large enough, and adding votes p > d1 > REST >
d2 > d3 for dummy candidates d1, d2, d3, we can ensure that the score of each z
is exactly the desired number (‖X‖+1)α1. (Recall that using Proposition D.3,
we can transform a 3DM-instance into an F -3DM instance when F is given in
unary.) As in the proof of Theorem E.5, we can adjust the points of candidates
in X and Y using votes that have z and p both in the 0-point segment of the
votes, and which therefore will not be removed by the controller.
For the second issue, we add points to Bi with votes as follows:
• A single vote Bi > d > REST > d > d1, where d stands for arbitrary
dummy candidates never used again,
• d1 > d > REST > d > d2, with d as above, of these votes we add
enough to ensure that d1 does not beat p, but cannot gain α6 points
without beating p. (If adding these votes lets d1 gain too many points,
we use additional votes having dummy candidates in the α1, α2, and α5
positions, and with d2 in the −α6 position, clearly these votes will not be
removed by the controller.)
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We now argue that the only way for the controller to remove points from Bi
is by voting them in the last two positions of every manipulation vote, which
then implies that the candidates from Z must lose their points by removals
of 3DM votes as in the proof of Theorem E.5. For this, we denote the set
Z ∪ {B5, B6} with R. These are the candidates that need to lose points against
p. Note that none of the votes we introduce have any candidate from R in the
α2 position. Therefore, by bribing ‖X‖ voters, the candidates in the set R can
only lose points (as always, relative to p) as follows:
• each of the ‖X‖ many removed votes lets the set R lose at most α1 points,
hence from the removal, these candidates (combined) lose at most ‖X‖α1
points.
• each of the ‖X‖ many manipulation votes lets the set R lose at most
‖R‖α1 + α5 + α6 points, since p gains α1 points against each of the ‖R‖
candidates in R, and additionally the candidates in the last two positions
lose α5 and α6 points, respectively. Therefore, the manipulation votes let
R lose at most ‖X‖(‖R‖α1 + α5 + α6) points against p.
Altogether, the bribery action therefore lets R lose ‖X‖α1 + ‖X‖(‖R‖α1 +
α5 + α6) = ‖X‖((‖R‖ + 1)α1 + α5 + α6) points. Since ‖R‖ = ‖X‖ + 2 (as
‖Z‖ = ‖X‖), this value is identical to ‖X‖((‖X‖+ 3)α1 + α5 + α6).
Initially, each z ∈ Z must lose (‖X‖+1)α1 points, andBi must lose ‖X‖(α1+
αi) points. Since there are ‖X‖ many candidates z, this means that the group
R must lose ‖X‖(‖X‖+ 1)α1 + ‖X‖(α1 + α5) + ‖X‖(α1 + α6) = ‖X‖((‖X‖+
3)α1 + α5 + α6) points.
Since the two values are equal, every possible loss of a point in the bribery
action must be used for the set R. Now assume that Bi loses a point by deleting
a vote (as opposed to the intention, i.e., losing points only by manipulation).
Then, a vote of the form Bi > d > REST > d > d1 is deleted. However, this
means that the candidate d1 gains too many points, and hence d1 must lose
points using a delete or manipulation action. This is a contradiction, since we
just showed that only candidates in R may lose points (relative to p) using the
bribery action. We therefore know that, in fact, only 3DM votes are removed.
This concludes the proof.
F.2.4 Proof of Theorem B.9
Theorem B.9. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α6) with α1, α2 > α3 > α6. Then
f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. This proof is obtained from the proof of Theorem E.6 similarly to the
way the proof of Theorem B.8 is obtained from that of Theorem E.5.
We write the generator f as f = (α, β, 0, . . . , 0,−γ) with 0 /∈ {α, β, γ}. As
in the CCDV hardness proof, for each triple (x, y, z) we add a vote x > y >
REST > z.
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As in the proof of B.8, following the recipe from Section 5.2, we again need
to increase the scores of each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z by ‖X‖α, and we introduce a
candidate Bγ who will be voted last in every manipulation vote.
As in the proof of Theorem E.6, setting up the scores is easier, since the 3DM-
votes are more attractive to delete, as deleting them “hurts” two candidates
instead of just one as in the proofs of Theorems B.8 and E.5:
• We can simply use setup votes that only have one relevant candidate in one
of the non-zero positions, and fill the other two with dummy candidates,
• This allows us to increase the points of all candidates in X ∪ Y ∪ Z by
‖X‖α and add a candidate Bγ with ‖X‖(α+ γ) points,
• then, by the same capacity argument as in Theorem E.6, only votes with
two relevant candidates (i.e., from X ∪ Y ∪ {B}) are deleted, hence the
candidate Bγ is voted last in every manipulation vote.
Therefore, the reduction works in essentially the same way as in Theorem E.6.
F.2.5 Proof of Theorem B.10
Theorem B.10. Let f = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , α3, α4, α5, α6) with α1 > α3 > α4.
Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. The proof is an easy application of the recipe from Section 5.2 to the
proof of Theorem B.10:
• Clearly, p will be voted first in every manipulation vote. Since the con-
struction will enforce that only 3DM votes will be deleted (each of which
lets p get α3 points), this means that p will gain ‖X‖(α1−α3) points from
a bribery action.
• As a consequence, we need to increase the points of each candidate by
‖X‖(α1 − α3).
• Additionally, we introduce candidates B4 and B5, where for i ∈ {4, 5}, Bi
must lose ‖X‖(α3 − αi) points from the manipulation votes.
• We additionally increase the points of B by ‖X‖(α3 − α6). This implies
that, in a successful bribery:
1. Only vote giving α1 points to B first can be deleted, and
2. B must be voted in a position awarding α6 points in every manipu-
lation vote.
Therefore, as long as we only use setup votes that give less than α1 points
to B, we know that these votes will not be deleted. Since B4 and B5 are in
the α3-segment of the 3DM votes, B4 and B5 will not lose points from the
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delete action, and therefore, all positions giving fewer than α3 points in the
manipulation votes will be filled with candidates B, B4, and B5.
It therefore remains to show how we can increase the relative points of B
sufficiently. Lowering the relative points of B to the exact required amount and
adjusting the points of the remaining candidates can be done as usual (see, e.g.,
the proof of Theorem B.10), note that we do not need votes that give α1 points
to B for this.
To increase the points of B, we simply transform the given 3DM instance
into an F -3DM instance for a suitably chosen F with an application of Propo-
sition D.3. This increases the relative points of B gained by the 3DM votes to
3F‖X‖(α1−α3). Since we need to increaseB’s score by ‖X‖(α1−α3+α3−α6) =
‖X‖(α1 − α6), choosing F = 1 +
⌈
α1−α6
α1−α3
⌉
suffices.
F.2.6 Proof of Theorem B.1
Theorem B.1. Let f be an polynomial-time uniform Q-generator with f(m) =
(αm1 , . . . , α
m
m) for each m, such that f uses at least three coefficients starting
from some m.
Then there is a polynomial-time computable function g such that
• g takes as input an instance M of F -3DM for some arbitrary F with
‖M‖ = n10 and produces an instance I of f -bribery with m = 3n candi-
dates,
• if αm4 > αm2n, and ‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖2+2‖X‖+2, then: M is a positive instance
of 3DM if and only if I is a positive instance of f -bribery.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to consider the case where αm4 > α
m
2n, and the value
‖M‖ satisfies the condition. We can also assume, without loss of generality,
that m is large enough such that f(m) uses at least three different coefficients.
We let X ∪ Y ∪ Z = {s1, . . . , s3k}. For each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, let i(c) denote
the unique index j with c = sj . We choose a value ℓ such that ℓ ≥ 3 and
(αm4 − αmm−3k) > k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1). We first prove that such an ℓ exists, a
matching one then can be found in polynomial time since f is polynomial-time
uniform.
For this, we first choose x as the number of sequential blocks of length 3k
starting at position 4, such that the last block ends before the position m− 3k,
i.e., x = ⌊m−43k ⌋−1. We now choose ℓ as the start of the block with the minimal
difference between the coefficient at position ℓ and the coefficient at position
ℓ+3k− 1, i.e., we choose ℓ ∈ N such that ℓ = 3+ x′ · 3k, and (αmℓ −αmℓ+3k−1) is
minimal. Then, since between position 4 and position m− 3k, we have at least
x of these blocks, the difference between αm4 and α
m
m−3k is at least x times the
difference inside the block starting at position ℓ, i.e.,
αm4 − αmm−3k ≥ x(αmℓ − αml−3k−1).
10in this case, n is in fact the number of tuples inM , not the size of a binary representation.
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Note that the left-hand side of this inequality is in fact strictly positive, since
we know that αm4 > α
m
2
3
m
, and 23m ≥ m − 3k, as m = 3‖M‖, k = ‖X‖, and
‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖2 + 2‖X‖+ 2. To obtain the required inequality (αm4 − αmm−3k) >
k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1), it therefore suffices to show that x > k. For this, note that
by choice of ‖M‖ and since m = 3‖M‖, and ‖X‖ = k, we have that
x =
⌊
m−4
3k
⌋− 1
≥ m−43k − 2
= 3‖M‖−43‖X‖ − 2
≥ 3(‖X‖2+2‖X‖+2)3‖X‖ − 2
= 3‖X‖
2+6‖X‖+6
3‖X‖ − 2
= ‖X‖+ 2 + 2‖X‖ − 2
> ‖X‖
= k,
as required. Hence ℓ as chosen above satisfies the requirements.
Now, let a 3DM-instance M ⊆ X × Y × Z be given. We denote ‖X‖ with
k. We construct an f -bribery instance as follows:
The candidate set is X∪Y ∪Z∪p∪B∪D, where p is the preferred candidate,
B is a set of nb := m−(ℓ+3k−1) blocking candidates, andD is a set of ℓ dummy
candidates. Let B = {b1, . . . , bnb}. Note that by construction, the number of
candidates is exactly m as required, and also ‖B‖ 6= ∅, ‖D‖ ≥ 3. Without loss
of generality, we assume that αmm = 0.
For each (x, y, z) ∈ M , we introduce a vote (we will again call these votes
3DM votes):
b1 > x > y > z > REST > Sxyz > p,
where REST contains the remaining blocking candidates and all dummy
candidates, and Sxyz contains each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z \ {x, y, z} in the i(c)-th
position, with dummy candidates taking the positions of x, y, and z. Let r(c)
denote the position in which c is positioned if c is among the first 4. (I.e., c gains
αmr(c) points from the votes introduced for a tuple containing c, and α
m
m−3k+i(c)−1
from the remaining 3DM votes.) For a candidate b ∈ B with b 6= b1, let i(b)
denote the position of b in the 3DM votes (i.e., b gets αm
i(b) points from each of
these votes).
We set up the (relative) scores of the candidates as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(c) = k · αm1 + αmr(c) + (k − 1)αmm−3k+i(c)−1 − kαmℓ+i(c)−1
• score(b1) = 2k · αm1 ,
• score(bi) = kαm1 + k · αmi(bi) − kαmm−i+1 for i ≥ 2,
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• for all dummy candidates, the scores are so low that they cannot win the
election with at most than k bribes.
We now show that the 3DM instance is positive if and only if p can be made
a winner in the f -election with bribing at most k voters, assuming that the
above scores can be realized by additional setup votes that will never be deleted
by the controller.
First assume that the 3DM instance is positive, i.e., there is a cover C ⊆M
with ‖C‖ = k. Then the following bribery action is successful:
• for each (x, y, z) ∈ C, we delete the vote introduced for (x, y, z),
• we add k votes of the form
p > REST > s1 > · · · > s3k > bnb > bnb−1 > · · · > b2 > b1.
Note that in the manipulation votes, a candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z is voted in
position m− nb − 3k + i(c) = ℓ+ i(c)− 1.
We show that none of the non-dummy candidates beats p after the bribery
action:
• p is voted last in every deleted voter and voted first in every manipulation
voter, p gains kαm1 points, therefore score(p) = kα
m
1 points.
• since C is a cover, for each c, one vote featuring c and (k − 1) votes not
featuring c are removed. Therefore, c loses αm
r(c) + (k − 1)αmm−3k+i(c)−1
points from the delete action. Since c is voted in position ℓ+i(c)−1 in each
of the manipulation votes, c gains kαmℓ+i(c)−1 points from the manipulation
votes. The final score of c is therefore k ·αm1 +αmr(c)+(k−1)αmm−3k+i(c)−1−
kαm
ℓ+i(c)−1 − (αmr(c) + (k − 1)αmm−3k+i(c)−1) + kαmℓ+i(c)−1 = k · αm1 , hence c
ties with p
• b1 loses αm1 points with each of the k deletions, and receives 0 points from
the manipulation votes. Therefore, b1’s final score is kα
m
1 , also tieing with
p.
• for b ∈ B \{b1}, bj loses αmi(b) points from each deletion, and gains αmm−i+1
points from each manipulation vote. Therefore, the final score of b is
kαm1 + kα
m
i(b) − kαmm−i+1 − kαmi(b) + kαmm−i+1 = kαm1 points, hence b also
ties with p.
For the other direction, assume that p can be made a winner by bribing at
most k of the 3DM votes. Clearly, every bribed voter will vote p first after the
bribery, therefore, p’s final score is kαm1 . Since b1 may not beat p, it follows that
b1 must gain 0 points from the manipulation votes. It also follows that there
are exactly k bribed voters, since b1 must lose kα
m
1 points in order not to beat
p. Similarly, in order not to beat p, each bi for i ≥ 2 may only gain kαmm−i+1
points from the manipulation votes. Therefore (allowing for swaps between the
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bi candidates that cancel each other out, and exchanging positions corresponding
to coefficients with the same value), we can without loss of generality assume
that the manipulation votes vote candidate bi in position m− i+ 1. Therefore,
the last nb many positions in all manipulation votes are taken by candidates
from B, and thus, in each of these votes, each candidate c gains at least αmm−nb
points. Since nb = m−(ℓ+3k−1), this means that each c gains at least αmℓ+3k−1
points in each manipulation votes.
Let C be the set of all tuples (x, y, z) such that the vote corresponding to
(x, y, z) is deleted. We claim that C is a cover. By the above, we know that
‖C‖ = k. Now assume that there is some c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z that is not covered
by C. Then, c is voted in position αm
m−3k+i(c)−1 in each of the removed votes,
and hence loses kαm
m−3k+i(c)−1 from the deletion of votes. Due to the above,
we know that c gains at least kαmℓ+3k−1 points from each manipulation vote.
Therefore, c’s final score is at least
k · αm1 + αmr(c) + (k − 1)αmm−3k+i(c)−1 − kαmℓ+i(c)−1 − kαmm−3k+i(c)−1 + kαmℓ+3k−1
= k · αm1 + αmr(c) − αmm−3k+i(c)−1 − kαmℓ+i(c)−1 + kαmℓ+3k−1
≥ k · αm1 + (αm4 − αmm−3k+i(c)−1)− k(αmℓ+i(c)−1 − αmℓ+3k−1)
≥ k · αm1 + (αm4 − αmm−3k)− k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1)
Since (αm4 − αmm−3k) > k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1), this value exceeds kαm1 , which is
the final score of p. Therefore, c beats the preferred candidate p, and hence the
bribery action is not successful, we have a contradiction.
It remains to show that we can add setup vote ensuring that the relative
points are as above, and that will never be deleted by the controller. Note
that the candidate b1 initially beats p with a headstart of 2kα
m
1 points. In the
manipulation votes, p can gain at most kαm1 points against b1 (by voting p first
and b1 last in all of the votes). Therefore, b1 must lose kα
m
1 points from the
delete actions, and p may not lose any points from the delete actions. In other
words, each of the k deleted votes must give αm1 points to b1, and 0 points to
p. Therefore, it suffices to construct setup votes that result in the above points,
and which never have, at the same time, p in a position giving 0 points and b1
in a position giving αm1 points.
For this, we modify the construction from the implementation Lemma:
• If, in the Lemma, the score of b1 is raised by αm1 (relative to p), then we
simply repeat one of the 3DM votes, which also has the desired effect.
(Note that the controller can never delete two copies of the same 3DM
vote, as then she will not be able to construct a cover, which is required
as seen above). The side-effect for the other candidates can then be undone
by modifying their reletive points (compared to p).
• If, in the Lemma, the score of some other candidate is changed (relative
to p), we proceed as follows: We choose v0 as the vote b1 > p > REST .
Then:
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– Since f uses at least 3 coefficients for m candidates, we know that
via rotation of v0, we never produce a vote that gives α
m
1 points to
b1 and 0 points to p.
– Since we are not increasing the score of b1 by α
m
1 , we never perform
a swap that lets p get 0 points and b1 get α
m
1 points.
Therefore, none of the setup votes give 0 points to p and αm1 points to b1,
which concludes the proof.
F.2.7 Proof of Theorem B.2
Theorem B.2. Let f be an polynomial-time uniform Q-generator with f(m) =
(αm1 , . . . , α
m
m) for each m, such that f uses at least three coefficients starting
from some m.
Then there is a polynomial-time computable function g such that
• g takes as input an instance M of F -3DM for some arbitrary F with
‖M‖ = n11 and produces an instance I of f -bribery with m = 3n candi-
dates,
• if αm2
3
m
> αmm−4, and ‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖3, then: M is a positive instance of 3DM
if and only if I is a positive instance of f -bribery.
Proof. The proof is obtained from the proof of the CCDV version (Theorem E.3)
in a similar way as the proof of Theorem B.1 is obtained from its CCDV version,
Theorem E.2.
Now let a 3DM-instance M ⊆ X × Y × Z be given; let m = 3‖M‖ be the
number of candidates, let k = ‖X‖. We write X ∪ Y ∪ Z as {s1, . . . , s3k}, and
for c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪Z, with i(c) we denote the unique index i with si = c, and r(c)
is 1, 2, or 3, depending on whether c ∈ X , c ∈ Y or c ∈ Z.
We first choose an ℓ ≥ 1 such that (αm3k+1 − αmm−3) > k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1) and
nb ≥ 1, where nb = m − ℓ − 3k + 1. We show that such an ℓ exists, the value
then can be found in polynomial time since f is polynomial-time uniform. We
proceed in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem B.1:
Let x be the number of sequential blocks of length 3k that start after position
1, such that after the start of the last block, there are still at least 3k−3 positions
left, i.e., x =
⌈
m−3k
3k
⌉ − 4 = ⌈m3k⌉ − 5. Now choose ℓ of the form ℓ = 1 + x′3k
with 1 ≤ x′ ≤ x such that αmℓ − αmℓ+3k is minimal. Then, (αm3k+1 − αmm−3) ≥
x(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1).
We first show that the left-hand side of this inequality is strictly positive.
Since αm2
3
m
> αmm−3, it suffices to show that 3k+1 ≤ 23m, i.e., 3‖X‖+1 ≤ 2‖M‖
(recall that m = 3‖M‖). This follows easily since ‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖3. To show the
required inequality, it now suffices to show that x > k. We obtain this as follows:
11in this case, n is in fact the number of tuples inM , not the size of a binary representation.
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x =
⌈
m
3k
⌉− 5 ≥ m3k − 6 = 3‖M‖3‖X‖ − 6
= ‖M‖‖X‖ − 6 ≥ ‖X‖
3
‖X‖ − 6 ≥ ‖X‖2 − 6.
Since ‖X‖ = k, this value exceeds k for sufficiently large ‖X‖. We therefore
have found a value ℓ as required.
Without loss of generality, we assume that αmm = 0, and that the gcd of
αm1 , . . . , α
m
m is 1.
We now construct the f -bribery instance as follows:
• the set of candidates is X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {p} ∪ B ∪D, where B is a set of nb
blocking candidates and D a set of dummy candidates such that the total
number of candidates is 3‖M‖,
• the preferred candidate is p,
• for each (x, y, z) ∈M , we introduce a vote b1 > Sxyz > REST > z > y >
x > p, where Sxyz,
• we introduce additional setup votes (see below) ensuring that the relative
points of the candidates are as follows:
– score(p) = 0,
– score(b1) = 2kα
m
1 ,
– score(bi) = kα
m
1 + k(α
m
1 − αmm−i+1) for i ≥ 2
– score(c) = kαm1 + α
m
m−r(c) + (k − 1)αm1+i(c) − kαmℓ+i(c)−1.
In a similar way as in the proof of Theorem B.1, we can show that p can
be made a winner of the election by bribing at most k of the above-introduced
voters if and only if the 3DM instance is positive. In particular, the controller
needs to bribe exactly k voters, since b1 must lose kα
m
1 points, and p must win
kαm1 points. The controller can make p win the election by bribing the votes
corresponding to a cover, and then letting every bribed voter vote
p > REST > s1 > s2 > · · · > s3k > bnb > · · · > b1.
Now assume that the controller can make p win the election by bribing at
most k (and hence, without loss of generality, with exactly k) voters. With
the same mechanism as used in the proof of Theorem B.1, we know that the
candidates b1, . . . , bnb must occupy the last nb positions in every manipulator
vote. Therefore, each candidate c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z obtains at least kαmℓ+3k−1 points
from the k manipulator votes.
Now assume that the bribed voters do not correspond to a cover. Since k
voters are bribed, then there is some candidate c such that at least two votes
voting c in one of the last four positions are deleted. Therefore, c loses at
most (k− 2)αm1+i(c) +2αmm−r(c) points from the delete action, and gains at least
kαmℓ+3k−1 points from the manipulation votes.
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Therefore, the final score of c is at least
kαm1 + α
m
m−r(c) + (k − 1)αm1+i(c) − kαmℓ+i(c)−1 − 2αmm−r(c) − (k − 2)αm1+i(c) + kαmℓ+3k−1
= kαm1 − αmm−r(c) + αm1+i(c) − k(αmℓ+i(c)−1 − αmℓ+3k−1)
≥ kαm1 + (αm1+i(c) − αmm−4)− k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1)
≥ kαm1 + (αm3k+1 − αmm−4)− k(αmℓ − αmℓ+3k−1).
Since p has at most kαm1 points after the bribery and (α
m
3k+1 − αmm−4) >
k(αmℓ − αmk+3k−1) due to the choice of ℓ, this means that c beats p, and hence
we have a contradiction.
It remains to show how to construct the setup votes to ensure that the scores
are as above. This can be done with the exact same mechanism as in the proof
of Theorem B.1.
F.2.8 Proof of Theorem B.3
As discussed above, compared to CCDV, we need an additional case to cover all
“many coefficients”-cases of the bribery problem, the above-stated Theorem B.3.
We now prove this result.
Theorem B.3. Let f be the generator (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, α6, α7) with
α3 > α4. Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. We write f as (α1, α2, α3, 0, . . . , 0,−α4,−α5,−α6) for α3 > 0 and α4 ≤
α5 ≤ α6 ≥ 0. We reduce from 3DM as follows: Let M ⊆ X × Y × Z be given.
Again, for c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, we define r(c) as 1, 2, or 3, depending on whether
c ∈ X , c ∈ Y , or c ∈ Z. We construct an instance of f -bribery as follows:
• the set of candidates is X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ p ∪ {b1, b2, b3} ∪D for a sufficiently
large set D of dummy candidates.
• for each (x, y, z) we add a vote x > y > z > · · · > d1, d2 > p for dummy
candidates d1 and d2.
• the preferred candidate is p, the controller’s budget is ‖X‖.
• we additionally add setup votes to ensure the following relative scores:
– score(p) = −(α1 + α6),
– score(c) = αr(c),
– score(bi) = kαm−i+1,
– the score of the dummy candidates is so low that they cannot win
the election.
If the 3DM instance is positive, then the controller can remove the ‖X‖
many votes corresponding to the cover, and let all bribed voters vote p > d1 >
d2 > REST > b3 > b2 > b1, this lets p gain k(α1+α6) points, each c loses αr(c)
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points, and each bi loses kαm−i+1 points, hence all candidates tie and p wins
the election.
For the other direction, if the controller can bribe at most k votes of the
above to ensure that p wins the election, then p has at most 0 points after the
bribery. By construction, the candidates b1, b2, and b3 must occupy the last 3
positions in each manipulation vote, therefore no c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪Z can lose points
from the manipulation votes. Therefore, the removed votes must form a cover
of X ∪ Y ∪Z to ensure that each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪Z loses αr(c) points and thus ties
with p.
It remains to show how to construct the corresponding setup votes. This
follows in the same way as in the proof of Theorem E.2: We add enough dummy
candidates such that in the votes resulting from the application of the construc-
tion lemma, at most 2 of the first 3 positions are filled with relevant candidates.
Since the points are “tight,” this means that the controller cannot afford to
remove a vote not introduced for a 3DM-tuple as above.
F.2.9 Proof of Theorem B.4
We now give the proof of Theorem B.4, classifying the complexity of the bribery
problem for all generators that only use two coefficients.
Theorem B.4. Let f be a generator such that αm3 > α
m
m−4 for some m, and
such that f only uses 2 coefficients. Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. Since f only uses two coefficients, we can without loss of generality as-
sume that for each m, f(m) is of the form (1a(m)0b(m)) for some functions
a, b : N → N. Note that a(m) + b(m) = m. Since f is a pure generator, the
functions a and b are monotone. Since αm3 > α
m
4 , we know that for sufficiently
large m, we have that a(m) ≥ 3 and b(m) ≥ 4. If a(m) ≤ 3 for all m, then,
for sufficiently large m, f is 3-approval, analogously if b(m) ≤ 4 for all m then
f is ultimately equivalent to 4-veto. In both cases, NP-hardness of f -bribery
follows from Theorem F.1. Therefore, we can assume that, for sufficiently large
m, a(m) ≥ 4 and b(m) ≥ 5.
We reduce from 3DM as follows. LetM ⊆ X×Y ×Z be a 3DM-instance, let
k = ‖X‖. We use the candidate set X ∪Y ∪Z ∪p∪D∪{B}, i.e., the number of
candidates is m = 3k+ 2+ ‖D‖, where D is a set of 9k+6 dummy candidates,
i.e., m = 9k+8. Without loss of generality, we assume a(m) ≥ 4 and b(m) ≥ 5.
We make a case distinction.
First consider the case that b(m) ≥ 3k+1. In this case, we treat the generator
as a variant of approval, since there are enough “bad positions” in the vote to
place “most of the candidates.” We set up the election as follows:
• for each (x, y, z) ∈ M , we introduce a vote b1 > x > y > z > D >
X ∪ Y ∪ Z \ x, y, z > p; again, we call these votes 3DM-votes.
• we set up the points such that, relative to p,
– score(p) = 0,
– score(b)1 = 2k,
– score(c) = k + 1 for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
– the dummy candidates do not have enough points to win the election,
– the controller’s budget is k.
It is easy to see that the preferred candidate p can be made a winner of the
election with at most k bribes if and only if the 3DM instance is positive:
If the instance is positive, then the controller can bribe a set of voters cor-
responding to a cover, and let each manipulator vote p > · · · > X ∪Y ∪Z > b1.
Then p gains k points, b1 loses k points, and each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪Z loses 1 points,
hence all non-dummy candidates tie and p wins the election.
For the other direction, clearly each c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z must lose 1 points, hence
the deleted votes form a cover.
The setup votes can easily be constructed by repeating 3DM votes to lower
the score of p relative to other candidates, and then using votes having p as
the first candidate and the remaining candidates in a suitable order to adjust
their score. Clearly, only (copies of) the 3DM votes will be deleted, since p is
optimally positioned in the other votes.
Now consider the case that b(m) < 3k + 1. Then a(m) = m − b(m) >
m− 3k − 1 = 9k + 8− 3k − 1 = 6k + 7. We use the following reduction:
• for each (x, y, z) ∈M , we introduce a vote b1 > X ∪Y ∪Z \x, y, z > d1 >
· · · > db(m) > · · · > x > y > z > p, again these votes are called 3DM
votes. Note that the candidates d1, . . . , db(m) each get 1 point from each
3DM vote.
• let d1, . . . , db(m) be the first b(m) dummy candidates (these exist, since
b(m) < 3k + 1),
• we set up the points such that, relative to p,
– score(p) = 0,
– score(c) = k − 1 for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
– score(d)i = 2k for each i ≤ b(m),
– the remaining dummy candidates do not have enough points to win
the election,
– the controller’s budget is k.
Again, p can be made a winner of the election with at most k bribes if and
only if the 3DM instance is positive:
If the instance is positive, the controller bribes a set of votes corresponding
to the cover, and lets each manipulator vote p > · · · > db(m) > · · · > d1. Then:
• p gains k points, and has k points in the end,
76
• each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z loses k − 1 point from the delete action and gains k
points from the manipulation votes, and thus ties with p,
• each di for i ≤ b(m) loses k points and hence ties with p.
Therefore, p wins the election. For the other direction, note that with delet-
ing k 3DM votes, the candidates bi for i ≤ b(m) still have k points each, and thus
must be places in the 0-point segment of the manipulation votes, in particular,
each c ∈ X∪Y ∪Z gets k points from the manipulation votes. Now assume that
the deleted votes to not correspond to a cover. Since k votes must be deleted
to ensure that b1 does not beat p, this means that there is some c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪Z
such that two votes not giving any point to c are removed. Therefore, c loses
only at most k − 2 points in the delete action, and thus (since c also gains k
points from the manipulation votes) ends with k + 1 points, beating c. This is
a contradiction.
The setup votes are constructed in the exact same way as in the above case
b(m) ≥ 3k + 1.
F.2.10 Proof of Corollary B.5
The following combines the previous results to obtain the hardness result for all
“many coefficients” bribery cases.
Corollary B.5. Let f be a polynomial-time uniform generator such that αm3 >
αmm−3 for some m. Then f -bribery is NP-complete.
Proof. If f only uses two coefficients, then the claim follows from Theorem B.4.
Therefore, assume that f uses at least three coefficients for the remainder of the
proof.
We reduce from 3DM. Hence, let a 3DM-instance M ⊆ X × Y × Z be
given. We apply Proposition D.3 to ensure that ‖M‖ ≥ ‖X‖3 and ‖M‖ ≥
‖X‖2 + 2‖X‖ + 2. Let m = 3‖M‖. Without loss of generality, assume that
m is large enough such that f(m) uses 3 different coefficients, and such that
αm3 > α
m
m−3 (note that when this inequality is true for any m, it remains true
for all larger m).
We now make a case distinction:
• If αm4 > αm2
3
m
, then we apply the reduction from Theorem B.1.
• If αm2
3
m
> αmm−4, then we apply the reduction from Theorem B.2.
Otherwise, we have that αm4 = α
m
m−4. Since α
m
3 > α
m
m−4, this implies
αm3 > α
m
4 = α
m
m−4, and f is of the form (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, α6, α7) with
α3 > α4. Therefore, the result follows from Theorem theorem:bribery fixed
coefficients additional case.
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